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INTRODUCTION1 
The purpose of this paper is to explore the effect international 
tribunals have on the judicial culture of domestic legal systems2 
compared to the effects of hybrid tribunals, and will show that the latter 
best develops domestic judicial culture. In doing so, six tribunals will be 
examined.3 After finishing the separate examinations, this paper will 
conclude that hybrid tribunals are better suited to develop a domestic 
judicial culture. Last, from a perspective that prioritizes the development 
of local judicial culture, this paper will consider the continuing viability 
of future tribunals given the creation of the International Criminal Court 
(ICC). It will then conclude for several reasons that ad hoc tribunals are 
not only still relevant, but preferable to the ICC. 
I. HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTS  
a. What is an International Criminal Tribunal? 
Obvious as this may seem, this paper recognizes two very distinct 
categories of international adjudicatory bodies: (1) “purely” international 
criminal tribunals and (2) hybrid international criminal tribunals. The 
  
 1. As I write this, I am beginning my tenth week of work at the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. The attitude in my work environment has 
been one of energy, purpose, and hope: energy, because we recognize the synergy and 
potential of the tribunal; purpose, because we understand the important mission of the 
tribunal and our part in it; and hope for the future because we know from personal 
experience that justice can be—and is—done by international criminal tribunals. 
 2. Throughout this paper the terms “domestic judiciary,” “domestic legal 
systems,” and “local judiciary” are used interchangeably. For the sake of this paper, they 
mean the same thing. They very broadly define any and all jurisprudential mechanisms 
which draws its jurisdictional authority from a state itself or any smaller municipality 
within the state. For the former Yugoslavia, these terms refer to all six Republics which 
came from it, but most specifically Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Serbia. “Judicial 
culture” is a completely separate term that reflects, fittingly, the culture of the domestic 
judiciary; it represents a legal system’s adherence to the rule of law, the energy of its 
courts, fairness of its trials, etc.  
 3. The Nuremberg Tribunal, the Tokyo Tribunal, International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR), Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), and Special Court 
for Sierra Leone (SCSL). 
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former is designed to function completely independently of any one state 
and is made by either an intergovernmental organization—such as the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) and 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”) created by the 
United Nations (“UN”)—or a treaty multiple states accede to, like the 
ICC’s Rome Treaty. A hybrid tribunal, by its very nature, is an 
institution dependent on and inseparable from the State; it is a unique 
blend of national and international, a national tribunal infused with so 
much international that it is neither. 
b. A Brief History of International Criminal Tribunals 
The first recorded punishments of wartime criminals were 
promulgated by the ancient Greeks as early as 400 B.C.4 However, these 
trials were neither international, nor did they apply international law or 
norms.5 Instead, “the concept of an international tribunal with its own 
super-national criminal justice power [can] be traced to the 15th century” 
in eastern France.6  
Peter von Hagenbach, the tyrannical and abusive ruler of a small 
French town, was brought before a panel of twenty-eight judges: eight 
from Breisach, two from “Berne, a member of the Swiss Confederation,” 
two from Solothurn, an ally of Berne, and the remaining sixteen from the 
allied towns on the Upper Rhine, with the Archduke of Austria 
presiding.7 While it is not perfectly clear whether this trial was 
“international,”8 most scholars maintain that it was.9 Hagenbach was 
  
 4. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL LAW 517 (2d rev. ed. 1999). 
 5. WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT 1 (3d ed. 2001). 
 6. Cenap Cakmak, Historical Background: Evolution of the International 
Criminal Law, Individual Criminal Accountability and the Idea of A Permanent 
International Court 3 (Rutgers Div. of Global Affairs, Working Paper No. 39, 2006), 
available at http://www.du.edu/korbel/hrhw/workingpapers/2006/39-cakmak-2006.pdf 
(quoting Scott W. Andreasen, The International Criminal Court: Does the Constitution 
Preclude Its Ratification by the United States?, 85 IOWA L. REV. 532 (2003)). 
 7. GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS APPLIED BY 
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS: THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICTS 463-65 (vol. 2 
1968). 
 8. Timothy L. H. McCormack, Selective Reaction to Atrocity: War Crimes and 
the Development of International Criminal Law, 60 ALB. L. REV. 690-92 (1997) (stating 
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charged generally with “trampl[ing] under foot the laws of God and 
man,” and specifically with murder, rape, and perjury.10 Defense counsel, 
in a foreshadowing of arguments made by Nazi defense counsel, argued 
that Hagenbach’s adherence to his duty to obey his military superior 
absolved him from blame.11 The court disagreed, holding that 
Hagenbach’s defense was “contrary to the law of God” and sentenced 
him to death.12 This was the first time an international court held an 
“individual responsible for perpetrating crimes that” would fall under the 
modern day definition of crimes against humanity.13  
The next notable international criminal tribunal was created almost 
400 years later by Great Britain. After Great Britain abolished its slave 
trade in the early 19th century, it struggled to enforce this decision on the 
high seas; this was because many slave trading ships switched between 
the flags of various western European nations and thus, under the law of 
the sea, this precluded her majesty’s ships from searching them, even if 
they were suspected slave ships.14 
To remedy this, Great Britain proposed to several nations that they 
jointly establish courts at each nation’s major harbors to try suspected 
slave traders and agree to relax, among themselves, the law of the sea 
regarding immunity of a ship flying another nation’s flag.15 Portugal, 
Brazil, the Netherlands, and Spain agreed fairly quickly, but the United 
  
the court had a very narrow view of the substantive law, only accepting the traditional 
laws of armed conflict).  
 9. Because all participants were arguably members of the Holy Roman Empire 
at this time, the title of “International Tribunal” depends on the one of the sovereignty’s 
independence from another. The utter disintegration of the Holy Roman Empire had 
changed Western European international relations into an ever-changing game of political 
alliances and unstable relations between small nation-states, up and coming towns, and 
traditional empires. GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 7, at 464. The legal 
relationship between these entities was “more comparable and akin to that of 
international law,” thus creating a sort of quasi-international law relationship. Id. 
 10. Id.; Christopher Keith Hall, The first proposal for a permanent international 
criminal court, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS (1998),  
https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/57jp4m.htm. 
 11. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 7, at 465. 
 12. Id. at 466. 
 13. Cakmak, supra note 6. 
 14. See Jenny S. Martinez, Antislavery Courts and the Dawn of International 
Human Rights Law, 117 YALE L.J. 550, 586-87 (2008). 
 15. Id. at 575-76. 
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States and France continued to balk for several decades, the former citing 
constitutional provisions it claimed would be violated by an accession to 
the treaty.16 
These early slave trade tribunals did not have very advanced 
evidentiary procedures and the like, but substantively they applied the 
law of nations relatively fairly and equitably.17 They issued written 
decisions, but there was no appellate process—just an arbitrator if a party 
claimed an unfair verdict.18 The success of the court varied tremendously 
by nation and region (the British judges were by far the most energetic), 
but on the whole it was an important and noteworthy step in the 
international criminal tribunal timeline.19 
After this, several attempts were made in the late 19th and early 20th 
to codify international humanitarian law with varying success.20 
However, there was no global movement to set up a system of 
international criminal adjudication until 1945.21 
c. Nuremberg 
i. Background and Results 
As WWII drew to a close and the allies began uncovering the horrors 
of the Nazi concentration camps, they knew they had to respond.22 On 
August 8, 1945, they created the International Military Tribunal 
(Nuremberg Tribunal) to try “persons who, acting in the interest of the 
  
 16. Id. at 577, 628-29. 
 17. Id. at 592 n. 184. 
 18. Id. at 587, 589-90. 
 19. Id. at 615. 
 20. See e.g., The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, Geneva Conventions of 
1864, 1929, etc.  
 21. Of course, there were other international courts such as the Permanent Court 
of International Justice, but these courts were not granted the power to try people 
criminally because international criminal law was still in a very rough form. THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION, 53-54 (Cesare Romano et al. eds. 2013). 
 22. One army Major was so struck by the horrors of Buchenwald that he said, 
“We need not be afraid of a hard peace settlement. The Germans upon whom it will fall 
have lost their right to consideration as human beings. They have lost their dignity of 
humanity. They have discarded every law of Christian decency.” WILLIAM BIRCH & 
ABNER ZEHM, IN THROUGH THE GATE, OUT THROUGH THE CHIMNEY, available in the 
Holocaust Museum Archives. 
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European Axis countries, whether as individual or as members of an 
organization, committed” crimes against peace, war crimes, or crimes 
against humanity.23 The framers of the charter were careful to 
meticulously define each crime,24 and the tribunal garnered widespread 
international support besides the four principal WWII victors: Great 
Britain, the United States, France, and China.25  
As far as the workings of the tribunal, each defendant had to be 
convicted by a majority of the four judges, and each major WWII victor 
had one judge on the court.26 The drafters also provided for additional 
tribunals,27 declared that there would be no immunity for government or 
political leaders,28 gave themselves the right to try individuals in 
absentia,29 and gave the Court authority to make its own procedural 
rules.30 Besides two suicides, most notably Herman Goering’s, the 
tribunal was successful in bringing the accused to justice. Within nine 
months31 it handed out nineteen sentences, including executions, life 
imprisonments, twenty year sentences, and a fifteen and ten year 
sentence.32 
  
 23. U.N. Secretary-General, The Charter and Judgment of the Nurnberg 
Tribunal: History and Analysis, at 4, Int’l law Comm’n, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/5 (1949) 
[hereinafter UNITED NATIONS]. 
 24. Charter of the International Military Tribunal art. 6, Aug. 8, 1945, 82 
U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter Nuremberg Charter]. 
 25. UNITED NATIONS, supra note 23, at 3 (1949) (“Greece, Denmark, Yugoslavia, 
the Netherlands, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Belgium, Ethiopia, Australia, Honduras, 
Norway, Panama, Luxembourg, Haiti, New Zealand, India, Venezuela, Uruguay, and 
Paraguay.”). 
 26. Nuremberg Charter, supra note 24, art. 2, 4. 
 27. Id. art. 5. 
 28. Id. art. 7. 
 29. Id. art. 12. 
 30. Id. art. 13. 
 31. Daryl A. Mundis, Completing the Mandates of the Ad Hoc International 
Criminal Tribunals: Lessons from the Nuremberg Process?, 28 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 591, 
596 (2005). 
 32. UNITED NATIONS, supra note 23, at 7-8. 
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ii. Importance of the Nuremberg Tribunal in International 
Criminal Law33 
It is hard to overstate the importance of the Nuremberg Tribunal. It 
was not the first international criminal tribunal, but it was the first 
modern one. It is the foundation upon which the world’s notion of 
“international criminal tribunal” rests. It was the first tribunal to gain 
such a powerful international cadre of supporters, the first to develop its 
own detailed system of procedural rules, the first to explicitly state that 
government or political leaders could be tried like anyone else, and, 
perhaps most importantly, the first to define the substantive law it 
applied. This was such an accomplishment that after the tribunal 
concluded its work, the General Assembly, at the request of President 
Truman,34 stated that it officially “[a]ffirms the principles of international 
law recognized by the Charter of the Nurnberg Tribunal.”35 
The Nuremberg Tribunal advanced international criminal law in three 
major ways. First, it showed that international criminal courts should 
apply customary international law to punish heinous acts. The 
Nuremberg Charter, and later the substantive law of the tribunal, was 
seen as a codification rather than creation of international law.36 Of 
  
 33. G.A. Res. 95 (I), U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/236 (Dec. 11, 1946). 
Nuremberg made it possible to conceptualize and then create other international criminal 
tribunals like the ICTY, SCSL, and others. Thus, although not the direct topic of this 
paper, its contributions are critical to fully understanding these later tribunals and, more 
importantly, these later tribunals’ impact on the affected countries’ judicial culture. As 
the first international court to promulgate a codification of international criminal law, 
Nuremberg provided a blueprint for future tribunals, and, in its own right, did much to 
develop the fledgling doctrines it recognized. See Estate of Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios, 
157 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1360 (2001). For example, after watching the success at 
Nuremberg, the UN recognized the value in punishing crimes against humanity and 
crimes of genocide. Gwynne Skinner, Nuremberg’s Legacy Continues: The Nuremberg 
Trials’ Influence on Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts Under the Alien Tort Statute, 
71 ALB. L. REV. 321, 327 (2008). Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 
1980). 
 34. UNITED NATIONS, supra note 23, at 11-12. 
 35. G.A. Res. 95 (I), supra note 33.  
 36. UNITED NATIONS, supra note 23, at 12-13, 17-18, 21. The United States saw it 
as a “codification” of international law, the Soviets a “re-affirmation,” the French an 
application of the Geneva Convention of 1937, and the British an “affirmation” of 
existing international law. Id. at 12, 24. The victors eventually agreed upon “affirmation” 
 
2015] The Superiority of the Hybrid Tribunal 219 
course, many argued that Nuremberg applied ex post facto law and not 
pre-existing principles of international law as the victors claimed.37 The 
court gave two strong responses: First, it pointed out that the tribunal was 
developed by the authority of the victors of WWII, in “their competence 
under international law,” and, second, it reiterated the application of 
already existing international law by resolutely highlighting Germany’s 
violations of the Kellog-Briand Pact of 1928.38 
Second, the Nuremberg Tribunal stood for the idea that these tribunals 
could hold not just states in violation of international norms, but 
individuals as well.39 Indeed, the defense argued vigorously that, as 
soldiers, the defendants were merely following their orders given to them 
by the state, and therefore should be protected under the doctrine of state 
sovereignty.40 The court strongly disagreed, stating that “if we cannot 
punish men for these crimes, we can punish no one. Men commit these 
violations not abstract entities.” 41 Almost more than anything else, 
Nuremberg enshrined forever the concept of individual responsibility in 
international law. 
Finally, Nuremberg advanced international criminal law when it 
defined three crimes, all of which are still prosecuted by modern 
tribunals. First, crimes against peace: the court, in following the French 
suggestion to give the Kellog-Briand pact great weight, found Germany’s 
aggressive battle-field tactics to be criminal on multiple levels.42 Second, 
the court punished the accused for “War Crimes,” defined as “violations 
of the laws or customs of war.”43 The court listed several examples of 
what this could entail, including murder, killing of hostages, wanton 
destruction of cities, and ill-treatment of prisoners of war.44 The decision 
  
as the best description, but the Tribunal itself stated that its substantive rules were “the 
expression of international law existing at the time of its creation.” Id. at 38. 
 37. Id. at 37-38, 43. 
 38. Id. at 38, 43. The Kellog-Briand Pact practically outlawed war and was 
signed by 63 nations, including Germany, Italy, and Japan. Id. at 43. 
 39. Paul J. Magnarella, Expanding the Frontiers of Humanitarian Law: The 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 9 FLA. J. INT’L L. 421, 433 (1994). 
 40. UNITED NATIONS, supra note 23, at 41. Note the similarity to the Hagenbach 
Tribunal above. See supra, n. 11. 
 41. UNITED NATIONS, supra note 23, at 41; Skinner, supra note 33. 
 42. UNITED NATIONS, supra note 23, at 46-61. 
 43. Id. at 61. 
 44. Id. 
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to prosecute these war crimes had “far reaching implications” that impact 
tribunals today.45 The court was careful to note that even though ‘war 
crimes’ was new phraseology, the substantive nature of these crimes was 
punishable under pre-existing international law.46 
It is through the third and last crime—crimes against humanity—that 
“Nuremberg principals have been legitimized and incorporated into the 
fabric of international law.”47 Crimes against humanity were defined as 
“murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane 
acts committed against a civilian population” during a war, “or 
persecutions on political, racial, or religious grounds” when committed 
in conjunction with war crimes or crimes against peace.48 This 
phraseology is still used by every international criminal tribunal. Each of 
these crimes is still punished today, largely due to their codification at 
Nuremberg. 
iii. The Nuremberg Tribunal’s Impact on Germany’s Judicial 
Culture  
The reaction of Germany’s judiciary to Nuremberg was very 
complicated and, some say, is still evolving. Directly after the 
Nuremberg Tribunal had concluded, East and West Germany had nearly 
opposite and (perhaps to some) counter-intuitive reactions to the verdict.  
In West Germany, the population as a whole was largely indifferent to 
the trial: perhaps from shame or remorse, but, irrespective of 
psychological motivation, it became clear that, supportive as they were 
of the trial at the time, they wanted to forget about it.49 If Nuremberg 
enjoyed any popularity in West Germany, it was strictly limited to the 
months and years directly following the end of the war.50 Later, the 
population’s feelings shifted towards a more open rejection of the 
tribunal.51 West Germany’s judiciary hesitantly accepted the idea of 
  
 45. Id. at 62; Skinner, supra note 33, at 328.  
 46. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 7, at 498.  
 47. Skinner, supra note 33, at 356-57. 
 48. Nuremberg Charter, supra note 24, art. 6. 
 49. GERHARD WERLE & FLORIAN JEßBERGER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL LAW 152 (3rd ed. 2014). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
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crimes against humanity, but strongly opposed the tribunal’s alleged use 
of victor’s justice and its violation of the principle of nullum crimen sine 
lege.52 These two criticisms would dominate West Germany’s thinking 
until reunification and the German system even after; indeed, the 
German legal system was largely the Nazi system with a new face—
many judges were members of the “old guard” and rejected Nuremberg’s 
legacy for emotional reasons.53 The prevalence and universality of these 
critiques created a judicial culture hesitant to punish state sponsored 
crime.54 
East Germany, on the other hand, accepted the Nuremberg Tribunal’s 
decisions and applied them liberally—perhaps with too much 
enthusiasm. For example, when it came to the principle of retroactivity, 
something the Nuremberg court strictly avoided, the East Germany legal 
code contained an explicit exception in its prohibition of retroactivity for 
Nazi-related crimes.55 Of course, at this time the communist propaganda 
in East Germany twisted all things to benefit Moscow.56 Indeed, East 
German courts were driven by the Soviets to prosecute Nazis more and 
more in the years following Nuremberg because, first, Nazis were the 
political enemy of communism and, second, these prosecutions had a 
palpable psychological effect on East Germany’s citizens.57 The Soviets 
wanted to erase positive feelings for the past in the East Germans’ 
minds—they wanted a new state with a new beginning; they used 
Nuremberg’s verdicts and the alleged retroactivity doctrine to legally and 
systematically eradicate all vestiges of the Nazi past.58 There is no better 
example of this than the Waldheim trials, a series of East German 
prosecutions of Nazis that consisted of rehearsed, Stalin-esque trials 
lasting no longer than a half hour and finishing with pre-arranged 
sentences.59 
  
 52. Christopher Burchard, The Nuremberg Trial and its Impact on Germany, 4 J. 
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 800, 802, 828 (2006). 
 53. Id. at 814. 
 54. Id. at 815. 
 55. Id. at 816-17. 
 56. Id. at 817-18. 
 57. Id. at 817-20. 
 58. Id. at 816. 
 59. Id. at 818-19. 
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Today, a unified Germany has largely accepted a more reasonable 
interpretation of the Nuremberg Tribunal’s judgments and has distanced 
itself from the emotions of its past. Indeed, Germany today is one of the 
foremost advocates of consistently applying international criminal law, 
the fruit of the Nuremberg Tribunal, through bodies like the ICC.60 In 
sum, the Nuremberg Tribunal has had a positive and “enduring effect on 
the German legal culture.”61 
d. Tokyo 
i. Background and Results  
After Japan surrendered, the Allies appointed General Douglas 
MacArthur as the Supreme Allied Commander in Japan; MacArthur 
ruled Japan as a quasi-military dictator.62 In late 1945 he gave an order 
setting up the International Military Tribunal for the Far East 
(“IMFTE”), a tribunal patterned almost exactly after Nuremberg.63 It 
came to be known colloquially as the Tokyo Tribunal.64  
The accused were split into three classes: Class A, the only class tried 
by the Tokyo Tribunal,  contained the individuals accused of the most 
egregious offenses like planning, initiating, and  waging an aggressive 
war; Class B consisted of those accused of conventional war crimes; 
and  Class C included those accused of crimes against humanity.65 
Class A’s trials lasted two and half years from April 1946 to 
November 1948, with seven of the accused sentenced to death, sixteen to 
  
 60. WERLE & JEßBERGER, supra note 49 (“Germany strongly supports the 
enforcement of international criminal law.”). 
 61. Id. at 822. 
 62. WILLIAM MANCHESTER, AMERICAN CAESAR: DOUGLAS MACARTHUR 1880-
1964 439 (1978). 
 63. Zachary D. Kaufman, Transitional Justice for Tojo’s Japan: The United 
States Role in the Establishment of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East 
and Other Transitional Justice Mechanisms for Japan After World War II, 27 EMORY 
INT’L L. REV. 755, 768 (2013). 
 64. Id. at 755-56. The tribunal was so closely patterned after the Nuremberg 
tribunal that repetition of its Charter would be redundant given the Nuremberg Charter’s 
treatment in Section II(c)(i). 
 65. Kaufman, supra note 63, at 764-65. 
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life imprisonment, one to twenty years, and one to seven years.66 Three 
of the accused had either died or were absent from trial for some 
reason.67 These sentences were delivered by a majority of eleven judges 
appointed by General MacArthur, prosecuted by a team consisting 
almost entirely of Americans, and defended by a defense team dominated 
by Americans and Japanese.68 It did not seem to have crossed the mind of 
the great General to include the Japanese judicial system at all in the 
process.69 
As far as Class B and C criminals, these “lesser offenses” were tried 
by various national tribunals several victor states established. For 
example, the United States military tribunals tried almost one and a half 
thousand Class B and C accused; several other nations (Australia, China, 
France, the Netherlands, Philippines, and the United Kingdom) tried a 
combined almost 6,000 accused.70 These trials, most of which started in 
1945, lasted until 1951.71 
ii. The Tokyo Tribunal’s Impact on Japan’s Judicial Culture 
It would be difficult to argue that the Tokyo tribunal impacted Japan’s 
judicial culture in any appreciable way. First, the Japanese people’s 
response to the tribunal, much like the German population’s response to 
Nuremberg, was apathetic.72 If anything, the Japanese were even more 
distant from the Tokyo tribunal than the Germans were of Nuremberg.73 
This deadened the tribunal’s impact on Japan’s post-war judicial system 
to the point of neutrality.74 
  
 66. Id. at 769-71. 
 67. Id. at 771. 
 68. Id. at 782. 
 69. Id. at 773. 
 70. Id. at 777-78. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Neil Boister, The Application of Collective and Comprehensive Criminal 
Responsibility for Aggression at the Tokyo International Military Tribunal: The Measure 
of the Crime of Aggression?, 8 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 425, 447 (2010). 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. (“One paradoxical result of the Tokyo IMT, inferred from its almost 
negligible impact in Japan except as something to be condemned as victor’s justice, is 
that the more you hold a group of individual leaders legally responsible for war, the less 
the rest of the population feel politically responsible.”). 
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Second, many of the legal doctrines and practices of the majority 
United States prosecution were not understood well by the largely 
Japanese defense team, and even though the IMTFE was not technically 
a United States institution, the overwhelming nationality of the personnel 
gave it that de facto feel.75 This was reflected in the courtroom, where 
Japanese defense counsel were often perplexed at legal theories and 
doctrines from not only the American attorneys, but the judges as well, 
all of whom reflected common-law and civil traditions from Western 
Europe, something that the Japanese legal professionals were fairly new 
to, especially procedurally.76 All in all, the IMTFE as a tribunal, and later 
as a potential source of substantive law for the Japanese, was discarded 
simply because it was so substantively foreign that the Japanese could 
not have used it even if they had had a desire to—which they did not. 
In sum, the IMTFE had neither a positive nor negative effect on the 
Japanese judicial culture. It was a foreign, confusing, and unimportant 
institution to the Japanese who, unlike the Germans, seemed to accept 
the fate of their leaders quickly and silently; there are “few traces,” if 
any, of an impact it had beyond the initial sentences it set down.77 
II. PURELY INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS: THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER 
YUGOSLAVIA AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR 
RWANDA. 
What is a purely international criminal tribunal? For lack of a better 
term, I use this phrase to describe the two tribunals that do not operate in 
the affected country and do not include within their institutions any part 
of the local or domestic judiciary. These are, respectively, the ICTY and 
  
 75. Maj. Nathaniel H. Babb, Don’t Forget the Far East: A Modern Lesson from 
the Chinese Prosecution of Japanese War Criminals After World War II, 222 MIL. L. 
REV. 129, 140 n. 63 (2014). 
 76. See TIMOTHY P. MAGA, JUDGMENT AT TOKYO: THE JAPANESE WAR CRIMES 
TRIALS 54 (2001). 
 77. Caroline Joan (Kay) S. Picart, Attempting to Go Beyond Forgetting: The 
Legacy of the Tokyo IMT and Crimes of Violence Against Women, 7 E. ASIA L. REV. 1, 3 
(2012). 
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ICTR.78 These tribunals, created by the UN Security Council (“SC”), 
were established because the international community saw that the 
domestic judiciaries of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda were unable 
to handle the difficulties that trying the necessary cases would bring.79 
a. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
i. Background of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia 
Throughout history, the Balkan region has become a semi-
geographically ordered mass of Catholics, Orthodox, and Muslims—
Serbians, Croats, and Bosnians.80 This ethnic diversity has continued 
until today. Traditionally, the Croats, Bosnians, and Serbians existed in a 
state of fairly constant tension, the former two peoples constantly jealous 
of the latter’s attempts—perceived or otherwise—to deprive them of 
their painfully fragile independence.81 Following the conclusion of 
WWII, Josip Tito and his Partisans set up the Socialist Federalist 
Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), encompassing the Balkan Peninsula’s 
many people groups.82 A few weeks after President Slobodan Miloševiü 
  
 78. Of course, the ICC also fits this definition, but the question of the ICC’s 
impact on the local judiciary will be addressed later in the article; for right now, the 
discussion is limited to ad hoc tribunals. 
 79. It is no secret that revolutionaries and anti-government parties instinctively 
target the existing legal structure in their coups or rebellions. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, 
THE SECOND PART OF KING HENRY THE SIXTH act 4, sc. 2. (as part of the general plan to 
commit regicide and overthrow the King, a coconspirator suggests that the first step for a 
successful coup will be to eviscerate the justice system; he states, “The first thing we do, 
let’s kill all the lawyers.”); Magnarella, supra note 39, at 435 (“As of February 1, 1995, 
Rwanda had only a few surviving judges and not a single functioning court.”). Every 
international criminal tribunal has been instituted to serve justice in a state plagued by 
civil war, and war-torn, emotionally exhausted nations do not have strong normative legal 
systems, especially because the winner of the civil war almost always imposes “victor’s 
justice.” Alejandro Chehtman, Developing Local Capacity for War Crimes Trials: 
Insights from BiH, Sierra Leone, and Colombia, 49 STAN. J. INT’L L. 297, 303 (2013). 
Indeed, many times, as in the case of Yugoslavia, the obliteration of local judicial 
systems are so complete that the effects are incredibly “difficult to overcome.” Id. at 302. 
 80. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL 
FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 7 (1996). 
 81. Id. at 11.  
 82. Id. at 13. 
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was reelected in 1991, the country began to disintegrate: Slovenia voted 
by referendum to become independent, and both it and Croatia passed 
resolutions officially proclaiming independence.83 
Relations with the newly formed Bosnia-Herzegovina deteriorated as 
well, and between 1992 and 1995 war crimes, crimes against humanity, 
and crimes against peace were perpetrated in and by many of the Balkan 
republics.84 At least 100,000 people died85 and 20,000 women raped over 
the five year period.86 A total analysis of the conflict is far beyond the 
scope of this paper, most specifically the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
which was “especially complex.”87 The Commission of Experts set up by 
the SC to determine whether there was a reason to set up a tribunal stated 
that: 
[I]n the former Yugoslavia, ‘ethnic cleansing’ has been carried out by 
means of murder, torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, extra-judicial 
executions, rape and sexual assaults, confinement of civilian population 
in ghetto areas, forcible removal, displacement and deportation of 
civilian population, deliberate military attacks or threats of attacks on 
civilians and civilian areas, and wanton destruction of property.88 
In 1993, after a long series of debates, the SC passed Resolution 827, 
establishing the ICTY.89 
  
 83. Id. at 25. 
 84. Id. at 11. 
 85. Bosnia war dead figure announced, BBC NEWS (June 21, 2007, 5:07:42 PM), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6228152.stm. 
 86. Elisabeth J. Wood, Multiple Perpetrator Rape During War, in HANDBOOK ON 
THE STUDY OF MULTIPLE PERPETRATOR RAPE: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY RESPONSE TO AN 
INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM 132, 140 (Miranda A.H Horvath & Jessica Woodhams eds., 
2013). 
 87. BASSIOUNI, supra note 80, at 41. My limited work at the ICTY has borne out 
the sometimes dizzying intricacies of the conflict.  
 88. U.N. Secretary-General, Letter dated May 24, 1994 from the Secretary-
General to the President of the Security Council, ¶129, U.N. Doc. S/1994/674, (May 27, 
1994). 
 89. S.C. Res. 827, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) [hereinafter S.C. 
Res. 827]. 
2015] The Superiority of the Hybrid Tribunal 227 
ii. Jurisdiction and Substantive Law of the ICTY Compared 
to Nuremberg 
When the SC adopted 827, it also adopted the proposed international 
criminal tribunal’s statute annexed to report (S/25274). Although 
amended nine times in the next few decades, this annex is still the heart 
of the ICTY’s daily operations.90 
The ICTY, funded by the general UN budget, is located in The 
Hague, Netherlands.91 Both the judges elected by the UN’s General 
Assembly and the staff attorneys are incredibly diverse, coming from 
Japan to Malta to the United States to South Africa. The tribunal began 
prosecutions in 1993, and at the time this article is being published, is 
finishing one of its last trials—that of Ratko Mladic.92 As proudly 
displayed on an infographic at the ICTY welcome desk, the ICTY has 
had an impressive trial and appeals record; not counting pleas, it has 
sentenced seventy-four accused, acquitted eighteen, transferred thirteen 
to regional courts, withdrawn indictments or terminated proceedings for 
thirty-six, and continues to both try and hear appeals for over twenty.  
As with all international criminal tribunals, trials are lengthy ordeals, 
usually taking years to complete; many accused have already served 
practically all of their sentences while in detention.93 Resolution 827 
made the job of extradition and suspect apprehension relatively easy for 
ICTY personnel by mandating that all UN member-states cooperate with 
  
 90. Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia, [hereinafter ICTY Statute], available at  
http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Statute/statute_sept09_en.pdf.  
 91. “As a matter of justice and fairness, it would not be appropriate for the 
International Tribunal to have its seat in the territory of the former Yugoslavia or in any 
State neighbouring upon the former Yugoslavia,” and not in the region. U.N. Secretary-
General, Rep. of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Para. 2 of S.C. Res. 808 (1993), ¶ 
131, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993). 
 92. I have had the tremendous opportunity to be involved with the Trial Chamber 
trying his case.  
 93. See, e.g., ICTY, Case Information Sheet for Blagoje Simiü, Miroslav Tadiü, 
Simo Zariüa, http://www.icty.org/x/cases/simic/cis/en/cis_simic_et_al.pdf (last visited 
Oct. 24, 2015) (combined, these three convicted individuals were sentenced to a total of 
twenty-nine years in prison; because of time already served during the trial, they served 
only a total of six years after conviction and an appeal).  
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the tribunal both in apprehending the accused and enforcing prison 
sentences.94 
The ICTY statute has many similarities to the Nuremberg charter. Just 
as the Nuremberg Tribunal did, the ICTY has the power to draft its own 
rules of procedure, but what really differentiates it from the Nuremberg 
Tribunal is the Appeals Chambers, created by Article 11 of the ICTY 
statute.95 Also, similar to the Nuremberg Tribunal, the ICTY has power 
to try breaches of the Geneva Conventions, war crimes, and crimes 
against humanity.96 Finally, Article 7 of the ICTY’s statute specifically 
emphasizes individual criminal responsibility and has also preempted 
arguments justifying actions on the basis of following military orders.97  
Conversely, the SC gave the ICTY the power to try crimes against 
genocide98—not something the Nuremberg Tribunal was explicitly 
commissioned to do. And, while the Nuremberg Tribunal only tried those 
who had helped the Axis powers, thus creating a de facto time window 
that closed with Japan’s surrender in 1945,99 Article 1 of the ICTY’s 
statute gives it jurisdiction over any case arising in the region “since 
1991.”100 Theoretically, the ICTY could begin more trials today as long 
as the alleged crimes fit under its subject matter jurisdiction.101 Perhaps 
most importantly for its public image—and by extension its ability to 
impact local judicial culture—the ICTY is an independent, autonomous 
body, not dependent on or controlled by states as was the Nuremberg 
Tribunal.  
  
 94. See S.C. Res. 827, supra note 89, at ¶¶ 4-5. 
 95. ICTY Statute, supra note 90, art. 11. 
 96. Id. arts. 2, 3, and 5. 
 97. Id. art. 7. 
 98. Id. art. 4. 
 99. See supra, Part I(c)(i). 
 100. ICTY Statute, supra note 90, art. 1. 
 101. Of course, the ICTY is doing just the opposite and, at the time this article is 
being written, is supposed to close in 2017. 
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iii. Perception of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia in the Eyes of the Local Civilian 
Population  
While the ICTY has had an undeniable and positive impact on the 
development of international criminal law,102 this invaluable contribution 
is not recognized by the local population, which sees the ICTY as a 
threat to the delicate balance of power in the region.103 Indeed, many 
former Yugoslavians see the ICTY not as an agent of justice, but as an 
apology from the UN for having let the conflict occur in the first place.104 
This notwithstanding, surveys of the population have shown that most of 
the population generally understands the ICTY’s worth as an agent of 
justice, reestablishing the rule of law.105 In the words of an anonymous 
Bosnian magazine editor, “People do not have confidence in the 
Tribunal. But it is the only light at the end of the tunnel. Without it, there 
would be no justice and this would be the final betrayal.”106 
  
 102. The body of procedural rules they created from customary international law 
continues to impact international criminal tribunals, especially because Nuremberg’s 
tribunal handed down no such guidance. See THEODOR MERON, THE MAKING OF 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 240 (2011). The substantive rules were no less 
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responsibility. Id. Most importantly, the ICTY has “laid to rest the age-old question of 
whether international law really is law.” Id. 
 103. Donna E. Arzt, Views on the Ground: The Local Perception of International 
Criminal Tribunals in the Former Yugoslavia and Sierra Leone, 603 ANNALS AM. ACAD. 
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Prosecutors, 18 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 102, 105 (2000) [hereinafter HRCIHRLC]. 
 104. Varda Hussain, Sustaining Judicial Rescues: The Role of Outreach and 
Capacity-Building Efforts in War Crimes Tribunals, 45 VA. J. INT’L L. 547, 563 (2005). 
For example, while lamenting his country’s fragmented judiciary, one Bosnian journalist 
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badly.” HRCIHRLC, supra note 103. 
 105. See HRCIHRLC, supra note 103. 
 106. Id. 
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iv. Perception of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia in the Eyes of the Local Judiciary 
Generally  
Multiple factors have contributed to the local judiciary’s distrust of 
the ICTY107: The first fear of the local judiciary is that the ICTY’s 
decisions are too political, i.e., biased. 108 “[S]ome [judges] welcomed the 
change” from the inept local judiciary, but there is a sneaking suspicion 
in many minds that the ICTY was, and is, “an intrusion by the 
international community into domestic affairs,” and thus administers 
only politically motivated victor’s justice.109 The “top-down” approach 
taken by the ICTY statute drafters led to harbored suspicions on the part 
of the local judiciary of political intervention.110 Second, the ICTY is 
located far away from the affected country in The Hague, Netherlands. 
This put a large amount of psychological distance between the 
population of the former Yugoslavia and tribunal.111 
Third, the ICTY has only had sporadic contact with the local 
judiciary. Many legal professionals have felt disrespected by this lack of 
consistency, which they see as disregard for the local legal system.112 
This is especially true in the context of international relations because the 
haphazard attention paid to judicial culture building emphasizes the 
disinterested and indifferent attitude the ICTY has taken. This has left the 
ICTY with a major problem of legitimacy in Bosnia.113 For example, 
local victim groups have “express[ed] bitterness when they learn of 
ICTY plea bargains,” something “unheard of in their national legal 
systems.”114 The ICTY seldom shared with the local judiciary or 
  
 107. Id. at 103-04. 
 108. Id. at 107. But see Arzt, supra note 103, at 235 (stating that since the ICTY’s 
inception, various defendants’ “confessions have made the tribunal more acceptable to 
Serbs and Croats who previously believed it was biased”) (citation omitted). 
 109. HRCIHRLC, supra note 103, at 116. 
 110. Arzt, supra note 103, at 232. 
 111. Id. at 228. 
 112. HRCIHRLC, supra note 103, at 103-04. 
 113. See generally, Hussain, supra note 104. For example, local victim groups 
constantly are in the dark as to ICTY proceedings; and, when they are made aware, they 
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235. 
 114. Artz, supra note 103, at 235. 
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population the reasons for its plea deal.115 Rather, it simply made the 
decision and left it to the population to figure out both that the plea 
existed and the reasons for it.116  
Not surprisingly, feelings towards the tribunal differ depending on the 
ethnicity of the individual judicial personnel—whether they are Serbian, 
Croatian, or Bosnian.117 Understandably, Serbians tend to be skeptical of 
the ICTY.118 Thus far, vast majority of those convicted by the ICTY have 
been Serbian, something many Serbian judges see as a sign of the 
ICTY’s partiality.119 Serbian judicial personnel see the court as a tool of 
the UN: an imposition by the international community on an ethnic 
group the latter considers most responsible for the genocide.120 One 
Serbian judge in a academic survey121 stated that his “court is more 
mature in its proceedings, and more expert and diligent in the conduct of 
trials.”122 Ironically, in this same survey, researchers found that even 
when Serbian judicial officials strongly disapproved of the tribunal; it 
was very rare that they felt “it should be abolished.”123 
Ethnic Croatian judges are far more supportive of the ICTY,124 but the 
Croatian civilian population overwhelmingly opposes sending indictees 
to the ICTY for trial.125 This makes sense given Croatia’s relatively less 
publicized role in the conflict’s crimes, and the wish of both the judiciary 
and civilians alike that Croat defendants be tried in national courts and 
not an entity almost a thousand miles away.126 While the Croatian 
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survey lived in Bosnia, so a statement of his or her ethnicity does not denote residence or 
work in the Balkan Republic of the same name. Id. at 102-03, n. 1. The survey asked 
questions of ethnic Serbians, ethnic Croatians, and ethnic Bosnians who were living in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina several years after the ICTY was created. Id. at 102-04. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. “The project employed qualitative methods to allow the judges and 
prosecutors to discuss their views in response to a series of open and closed-ended 
questions. [Some had war crime experience, others did not].” Id. at 111. 
 122. Id. at 131. 
 123. Id. at 132. 
 124. Id. at 135. 
 125. Arzt, supra note 103, at 233. 
 126. Id.  
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population may be skeptical of the ICTY, most Croatian judges believe 
that given enough time, “the work of the Tribunal could play an 
important role in reconciliation and reconstruction” of the local judicial 
culture.127 
Ethnic Bosnians, legal professionals and civilians alike, have the most 
positive view of the ICTY of any ethnicity in Yugoslavia.128 In higher 
levels than Serbians or Croats, Bosnians view the court as a neutral and 
fair institution for two reasons: First, Bosnian judges see the international 
community as the correct and even necessary authority to try high-profile 
war criminals because so many of these people “still wield tremendous 
power” within the country.129 Second, even if the ICTY would have 
allowed local courts to try criminals, many Bosnian courts were not well 
enough equipped to handle the political pressure that would come along 
with these trials; it would be a difficult trial even for the most well-
intentioned, fair judge.130 In sum, most Bosnian judicial personnel, and 
especially judges, see the ICTY as “a neutral and fair court,” especially 
for those in power.131 
v. Impact of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia on the Local Judiciary 
Early in its history, scholars were not sure whether the ICTY had an 
identifiable impact on the local judiciary or its prosecution of war 
crimes.132 Of course, with its focus on the deterrence of future crimes and 
not the improving of the local legal system, it is no surprise that the 
ICTY was completely apathetic with regards to local judicial culture.133 
Its primary focus was showing a “commitment on the part of the 
international community to hold perpetrators of atrocious war crimes 
responsible,” not to the Balkan’s rule of law.134 Thus, any local judicial 
  
 127. HRCIHRLC, supra note 103, at 135. 
 128. Id. at 128. 
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culture development the ICTY accomplished was really “ancillary to the 
role of the tribunals.”135  
It is now clear that the ICTY’s impact on the local judicial culture has 
been negligible. The appreciation the Bosnian and Croatian judges had 
for the ICTY shows that at one time it possessed the ability to influence 
the domestic judiciary, and the ICTY may have been the institution most 
capable of restoring the local judiciary’s legitimacy and rule of law 
culture.136 The uniqueness of the ICTY’s de facto responsibility to shape 
the local judicial culture, even if this responsibility is not explicit in its 
original mandate, makes its failure in this area sting.137 Indeed, even 
though many local judicial personnel—especially judges—see the ICTY 
as a fair and neutral court, it has probably negatively impacted the 
development of the region’s judicial culture in several ways.  
First, relationships between the ICTY and “national courts ha[ve] 
been virtually non-existent.”138 Some have described this lack of 
relationship as “detrimental” to the local judiciary’s development.139 For 
example, the ICTY does not conduct training or teaching sessions for the 
domestic judiciary in the former Yugoslavia, but has largely “focused 
solely on its own prosecutions.”140 This is an irresponsible choice on the 
part of the ICTY if it at all wants to strengthen courts in the region. After 
any civil war, and especially after a conflict as vicious as that which 
surrounded Yugoslavian dissolution, a country’s judiciary must struggle 
to reclaim its legitimacy; a basic, functioning judiciary and growing a 
strong judicial culture is pivotal for this, so the ICTY making the 
domestic judiciary ‘ride the bench’ has weakened the latter’s legitimacy 
in the eyes of the populace and increased its trouble building a strong 
judicial culture.141 
Second, not only has the ICTY generally refused to build 
relationships, but it also consistently refuses to engage in the most basic 
communication with local courts—a gesture even less involved than 
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 136. HRCIHRLC, supra note 103, at 140. 
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more traditional relationship building.142 Judicial officials have pointed to 
The Hague’s near-deafening silence as one of their chief concerns with 
the ICTY and a major reason that—respected as it may be in the 
abstract—its existence and work has not generated parallel practices on 
the part of the regional judiciary.143 Communicating with the local 
judiciary is a necessary element in judicial culture development, and the 
ICTY has failed in this.144 
Third, incredible sums of money have been spent on the ICTY, and, 
much as it may have accomplished in the field of international criminal 
law,145 no effective law enforcement exists today in the former 
Yugoslavia because this money and other resources of the ICTY were 
not invested in the domestic judiciary—the most secure investment the 
UN could make to get a good return on judicial culture growth146—but 
the preservation and continuation of the institution. Eventually some 
outreach programs were started,147 but by that point the damage was 
done.148 
Fourth, the ICTY’s “flying solo” approach has discouraged the local 
courts from prosecuting war crimes. This approach allows—and indeed 
forces—the local judiciaries to assume that the ICTY will clean up their 
jurisprudential messes, so if they have an unfair trial, slipshod 
procedures, or even corruption, they rely on the safety net of the ICTY 
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instead of conducting a fair, efficient trial themselves.149 The ICTY’s 
“reliev[ing] local authorities from the expectation of having to conduct 
effective prosecutions in war crimes cases” is the antithesis of judicial 
culture development.150 Keeping in mind the dangers of politically 
motivated trials, in 2005 the ICTY began cautiously transferring many 
cases to courts in the region, but this came about 12 years after the court 
was founded, and only a handful of cases have been transferred.151 
The bright spot in all of this failure is that the domestic judiciary still 
believes in the ICTY’s mission, especially those who have had the rare 
opportunity to interact with the ICTY. Some judicial professionals and 
civilians have reservations, especially Serbians, but most believe that the 
ICTY will aid judicial culture development long-term.152 Judicial leaders 
want to interact with the ICTY—even those who disapprove understand 
the uniqueness and wealth of knowledge it brings to the Balkan 
Republics and they “express[] genuine interest in receiving more and 
direct communication from the Tribunal.”153 Those who have gotten a 
chance to interact with the ICTY gained “a deep respect for” both it and 
its staff; this interaction almost always erases any of the concerns 
mentioned above and emphasizes the “professional integrity” of the 
institution to those who need to understand its legitimacy the most.154 
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In sum, while it may have started off altogether wrongly, the positive 
feelings of judicial personnel provide hope—dim though it may be—that 
in its twilight years the ICTY, through its outreach programs and 
intentional communication with the domestic judiciary, might somehow 
reverse its negative impacts on the region’s domestic judicial culture in. 
However, it remains just that: a dim hope. 
b. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda  
i. Background of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda 
The background of the Rwandan genocide is one of the most 
coldblooded, chilling tales in modern history. The great majority of 
Rwanda’s population comes from two tribes: the Hutus and Tutsis.155 
After a Tutsi rebellion which resulted in the death of President 
Habyarimana of the Hutu Party, the Hutu-controlled government 
responded by arranging a systematic genocidal campaign against the 
Tutsis beginning in mid-1994.156  
The military incited civilians to act with them against the Tutsis by 
arming civilians and urging them to fight.157 It even targeted moderate 
Hutus who did not approve of the killing.158 “[A]t least one million 
people in a country of 7.5 million were killed between April and July 
1994,” and of the 930,000 Tutsis in Rwanda pre-genocide, only 130,000 
survived; a stunning 800,000 persons were killed in a 100 day period, 
mostly with machetes.159 Post-civil war, the Tutsi’s regained control of 
the Rwandan government.160 
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ii. Creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda 
The legal system of Rwanda was decimated by the genocide. In 
keeping with the motif of killing all the lawyers, the rebels slew all but a 
few judges, “and not a single functioning court” existed in Rwanda as of 
February, 1995.161 Seeing this, the SC took action in July 1994 by 
requesting that the Secretary General establish a commission to decide 
whether genocide had taken place in Rwanda.162 In November, the 
Secretary General responded that there had been genocide, and asked the 
SC to create a tribunal using its Chapter VII authority.163 The SC 
immediately agreed, finding authority under Articles 39, 41, and 48 of 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter to create a tribunal with jurisdiction in 
Rwanda and the surrounding countries.164  
These provisions give, in varying degrees, the SC broad discretion on 
how and when to take actions in the interest of international peace; the 
SC, probably considering “the massive flow of refugees and the 
remnants of the Hutu militias to neighboring countries” as a potential 
breach of international peace,165 set up the ICTR to “contribute to the 
process of national reconciliation and to the restoration and maintenance 
of peace.”166 Ironically, on the motion to create the tribunal, the only 
dissenting vote was Rwanda.167 
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iii. The Tribunal Itself: Jurisdiction and Substantive Law of 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
Compared to the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia and Nuremberg Tribunal 
The ICTR was created just a year after the ICTY, so the ICTR had the 
benefit of using several institutional organs of the older, already 
established ICTY. For example, the prosecutor of the ICTY doubled as 
the prosecutor for the ICTR. Both had the same appellate chambers, rules 
and procedures, and tried violations of the same substantive laws—
Additional Protocol II, the Genocide Convention Rwanda signed, and the 
universal jurisdiction crimes punished at Nuremberg; and, the judges 
were elected in the same way.168 Also like the ICTY, the trials were not 
held in the affected country, but in a remote location: Arusha, 
Tanzania.169 
However, unlike the ICTY, the ICTR had jurisdiction over crimes that 
occurred in the territory of adjacent countries such as well as Rwanda 
itself.170 Most interestingly, the ICTR “and national courts” were given 
“concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute persons for serious violations of 
international humanitarian law in the territory of Rwanda.”171 This article 
did not give grant judiciary authority, but ensures that the ICTR has a 
piece carved from the same jurisdictional pie.172 The ICTR statute also 
gave the tribunal primacy over all national Rwandan courts.173 By the 
time the tribunal announced its closure in late December 2014,174 twenty 
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years after its creation, it had entered sixty-one convictions at the cost of 
two billion dollars and was on its last Appeal.175 
The purpose of the ICTR is critical to understanding its impact on the 
judicial culture. Like the ICTY, the ICTR’s purpose was not to try every 
murderer in Rwanda.176 Rather, it was instituted to try those who had led 
the genocide—top level military and political leaders upon whom the 
responsibility for the genocide ultimately rests.177 It also was instituted 
for the purpose of deterrence.178 Even after a million people died tensions 
still ran high in Rwanda, so it was necessary to demonstrate that blatant 
human rights abuses would not be tolerated by the international 
community.179 
iv. Struggles of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda 
The ICTR has had several struggles: First, it did not strike an 
“appropriate balance between the local culture and the international 
tribunal.”180 Soon after the genocide ended, the ICTR developed Gacaca 
courts—local courts focused on lower level genocide trials.181 These 
courts were highly successful,182 but for the first six years of its 
existence, the ICTR largely ignored them because they were a non-
traditional system of adjudication.183 This initial lack of communication 
(practically speaking) hardened many Rwandan hearts toward the ICTR 
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and almost completely barred it from positively impacting Rwanda’s 
judicial culture.184 This happened not only because the ICTR chose to 
ignore Gacacas, but was also the result of Rwandan judicial officials’ 
deep seeded mistrust of international involvement in Rwandan affairs.185  
Second, relations between the Rwandan judiciary and ICTR have 
never been smooth because the issues Rwanda originally raised with 
regards to the ICTR were never addressed by the UN, and this has hurt 
the legitimacy of the ICTR in the eyes of the local judiciary.186 One 
organization of genocide survivors went so far as to ask its members to 
boycott the tribunal because it saw the tribunal’s work as “victor’s 
justice.”187 Indeed, many view the tribunal as enshrining and protecting 
Tutsi power post-genocide in Rwanda.188 
Finally, the domestic government has done much to oppose the 
workings of the tribunal. Rwanda’s extremist Tutsi party, the RPF, 
placed excessively restrictive travel requirements on witnesses traveling 
from Rwanda to Tanzania, “‘effectively blackmailing’ the tribunal” to 
ensure that their actions during the conflict would not be brought to the 
court’s attention.189 Further, the Rwandan government attempted to 
undermine the ICTR by publicly criticizing them and occasionally 
suddenly withdrawing local support; these actions were met with only a 
mild SC warning, which came far too late to be of any practical use.190 
v. Impact of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda on the Local Judiciary 
Overall, though, the ICTR has had a net positive effect Rwanda’s 
judicial culture. From its inception, the drafters of its statute understood 
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that its shared jurisdiction with the local judiciary allowed it to facilitate 
the growth of Rwandan judicial culture in five specific ways: legitimacy, 
deterrence, judicial reform, personnel, and political reform.191 
First, even though the ICTR stretched the bounds of pre-existing 
international criminal law, all challenged portions of the statute survived 
judicial scrutiny.192 Legitimacy is a necessary but not sufficient 
component to a strong judicial culture, and legitimizing the ICTR, 
specifically with regards to the kinds of crimes it was created to 
prosecute, allows it to impart that legitimacy to the local judiciary.193  
Second, the ICTR proved a deterrent to “renewed genocidal 
attacks.”194 Ethnic tension in Rwanda did not end with the creation of the 
tribunal, and there was a real threat that the conflict would renew.195 The 
international presence the ICTR brought with it was enough to stop any 
potential renewal of hostilities. This gave domestic Rwandan courts time 
to rebuild their infrastructure and legitimacy with the local population. In 
short, the ICTR effectively gave the Rwandan judiciary the breathing 
room it needed to get back on its feet and prepare itself for any potential 
future ethnic troubles and prosecutions of already-committed crimes.196 
Third, Rwanda undeniably reformed its judicial culture because of the 
ICTR, and the ICTR’s policies.197 Because the ICTR had primary 
jurisdiction over Rwandan courts, it often chose to prosecute cases itself 
rather than hand them over to Rwanda’s tattered judiciary.198 Like any 
country, Rwanda desperately wanted international recognition of its 
government and legal system, and the ICTR’s perceived spurning was 
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just the opposite.199 Rwanda has undertaken several reforms in order to 
facilitate this transfer of cases from the ICTR to the local judiciary.200 For 
example, it abolished its death penalty.201 Not only did this policy 
decision facilitate case transfers, but general relations between the local 
judiciary and the ICTR improved as well.202 It also established a witness 
protection unit, probably to remedy the government’s earlier refusal to 
provide this protection.203 Additional reforms “paved the way for the 
ICTR to agree to transfer cases to” the Rwandan judiciary.204 The 
Rwandan judiciary’s increased caseload is a positive thing because not 
only are “domestic prosecutions . . . better at fighting impunity than 
international trials,”205 but these judicial successes breed even more 
success and a heightened sense of legitimacy. Thus, the ICTR’s policy to 
only hand over a case if it thought the defendant would get a fair trial 
was instrumental in shaping Rwanda’s judicial culture for the better.206 
Fourth, the human element: Local judicial culture has been bolstered 
by the personnel coming into and out of the tribunal. Foreign personnel 
bring expertise and experience to a decimated legal system, and local 
legal professionals have gotten quite a bit of beneficial training while 
employed by the tribunal, even with the ICTR physically in another 
country.207 Further, “thousands of African staff members,” their families, 
and communities have been employed—by and interacted with—the 
tribunal, many of them Rwandan.208 One scholar grandly described this 
human element as “a stone cast into a pond—sending ripples extending 
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all the way to far off and as yet unknown shores.”209 Thus, not only has 
the ICTR infused Rwanda’s professional legal community with legal 
knowledge and competent attorneys, but the latter’s judicial culture has 
grown because civilians have learned concepts like human rights and the 
rule of law.210  
Finally, the ICTR has “profoundly affected the political landscape in” 
Rwanda.211 Unlike other national judiciaries of affected nations, “the 
Rwandan national courts have vigorously pursued prosecutions of 
suspected war criminals,” and this is specifically due to the influence of 
the ICTR.212 Although there was undoubtedly Tutsi-caused disruption 
early on in the tribunal’s work, a complete view of the ICTR’s history 
reveals that it had a profound impact on the attitude of the country’s 
leaders with regards to war crimes prosecution; instead of blocking the 
work of justice, Rwanda’s government, led by their judiciary, has now 
become an active proponent—albeit, sometimes perhaps self-servingly—
of prosecuting international law violations.213 
Comparatively, the ICTR did far more for local judicial culture than 
the ICTY has by legitimizing the local judiciary, deterring future 
conflict, acting as a catalyst for reforms in Rwanda’s legal system, 
imbuing Rwanda’s legal system with competent professionals, and 
changing the way Rwanda’s government views war crimes adjudication. 
Of course, now that the ICTR has finished its work, additional judicial 
culture development can no longer be institutionally accomplished, but, 
“beyond a doubt, the ICTR had a profound short and medium term effect 
locally, regionally in East Africa[,] and internationally.”214 
c. Five Problems Both Tribunals Face 
While every tribunal is different, there are several struggles which 
international criminal tribunals and domestic judiciaries of war torn 
countries alike find difficult to navigate. First, the tribunal usually faces a 
kneejerk and carte blanche rejection of its work by the local judiciary; 
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this is hard to overcome.215 What is worse, though, is that these 
judiciaries not only reject the tribunal’s specific sentences and mandates, 
but its legal ideology as well; the fundamental principles the tribunal 
espouses become collateral damage, made guilty by their association 
with the tribunal’s more concrete work.216 Also, local judiciaries often 
reject a tribunal’s normative system because they feel a loyalty to their 
own pre-existing normative systems.217 However, the affected region’s 
systems usually do not exist or are so shattered by conflict that it is not 
practical to rely on them.218 Of course, local judiciaries do not see this. 
Second, every tribunal struggles with legitimacy in the eyes of the 
local citizens.219 It should capture the hearts of its country’s citizens or, at 
the very least, establish credibility with them in order to deter future war 
crimes,220 especially because deterrence by building respect for law is 
one of the main functions of international criminal tribunals.221 After a 
country suffers a horror like genocide, a tribunal is in the perfect position 
to rebuild a “culture of accountability” within the local judiciary.222 
Unfortunately, this rarely happens. The citizenry are all too ready to 
transpose the faults of their justice system onto this new entity, doing so 
with nearly every tribunal;223 and a tribunal devoid of legitimacy itself 
has none to impart to the local judiciary.  
More specifically, tribunals struggle in how to fix this lack of 
legitimacy. A tribunal can try to publicize the process of the tribunal—
this has helped in some situations224—or it can seek to include citizens as 
witnesses, local legal professionals as members in the court, or by 
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reaching out to the local media.225 No matter where a tribunal is located 
or what it does, local “ownership is vital if a tribunal is to have an impact 
on the often stated goals of promoting reconciliation, developing a 
culture of accountability, and creating respect for judicial institutions in a 
post-conflict society.”226  
Third, in large part, a tribunal’s effectiveness depends on—in the 
words of American business theory—location, location, location. 
Because a “tribunal located far away from the affected country and 
operated by foreigners cannot train local actors in the necessary judicial 
skills” that further judicial culture, tribunals located outside the affected 
country have little to no impact on the local judiciary.227 Seemingly, in 
the mind of the beleaguered populace, geographical distance equates to 
institutional indifference. There is any number of reasons for this 
phenomenon; the crimes did not happen overseas, but in the affected 
country, and a potentially limited level of education of the affected 
country precludes an understanding that justice can still be meted out 
from thousands of miles away. Also, a removed tribunal cannot 
disseminate information about processes and progress effectively, and 
even if it was located in the affected country; mere location is not enough 
to “instill a sense of the court’s legitimacy” in local opinion.228 At the end 
of the day, we will always have a problem determining how much 
location impacts the legitimacy of a tribunal and, by extension, the 
eventual legitimacy of the local judicial culture.229 
The fourth problem is international recognition and support. The 
international political community is a dynamic, ever-changing landscape, 
and no tribunal is ever sure of even moderately stable support. For better 
or worse, tribunals depend on international recognition to succeed,230 and 
given current theories of international law with the sovereign state as the 
dominating actor, this is understandable.231 Of course, not only must the 
tribunal have “the full support of the international community,” but also 
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the “major local stakeholders.”232 This second endorsement may be 
harder to secure than the first.  
Finally, there is a great danger that substantive law principals 
developed and applied by the tribunal will not be adopted by the local 
judicial culture.233 Unfortunately, the critical work of developing 
substantive norms in local judiciaries post-conflict may be where 
international criminal tribunals fail the most.234 As Costi explains, legal 
norms imported from the relatively healthy legal systems of the tribunal 
judges are not integrated with the affected country’s legal system 
because judicial culture is difficult to change by extrinsic means.235 
Instead, the local judiciary and population must take ownership of these 
values, and the only way to do this is by teaching and integrating, not 
imposing.236 Tribunals have a great ability to impact a local judicial 
culture’s normative and substantive standards, and can do so by 
involving the local judiciary and seeking to merge substantive ideals 
instead of impose them.237 
d. Problems Using the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia and International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda in a Judicial Culture Development Analysis 
An analysis of the ICTY’s and ICTR’s impact on the respective 
domestic judiciaries has the danger of treating those tribunals unfairly for 
three reasons. First, they were not created to build local judicial culture 
or bring reconciliation to the people, but simply to punish violations of 
international law.238 At the time of their formation, the specific goal of 
judicial culture development was not a priority in anyone’s mind.239 Only 
now are we beginning to see local development as a priority of 
international criminal tribunals.240  
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Second, unlike later tribunals, the ICTY and ICTR placed an 
extraordinarily heavy focus on self-preservation,241 potentially ignoring 
the financial and logistical needs of the local judiciary.242 A substantive 
analysis of their success aside, the ICTY and ICTR were massive money 
pits,243 (which is what eventually led to the adoption of “smaller hybrid 
courts”244), and, thus, local judicial culture development never appeared 
as a potential line item in the tribunals’ budgets. 
Third, consistent with ignoring local judicial culture, both tribunals 
were located outside the affected country. This, as discussed above, 
“creates a number of challenges and difficulties, principally involving 
making the trials accessible and meaningful to those victims in whose 
name justice is pronounced.”245 In sum, the success of the tribunals is 
not—nor was it intended to be—the building of the local judicial 
culture.246 Instead, the tribunals’ purpose and respective success has been 
twofold: to “fend of critiques of ‘victor’s justice’ and to create a growing 
body of substantive and procedural law on crimes against humanity.”247  
III. HYBRID TRIBUNALS GENERALLY  
Hybrid tribunals are tribunals in which “both the institutional 
apparatus and the applicable law consist of a blend of the international 
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and the domestic.”248 They suffer a few of the normal problems of purely 
international criminal tribunals, such as legitimacy in the eyes of the 
local judiciary, but also must deal with more specific problems caused by 
their unique blend of international and national jurisprudence. Equally, 
this blend gives them the parallel opportunity to positively influence the 
affected country in ways a purely international criminal tribunal cannot.  
First, because their very nature is one of cooperation and 
coordination, hybrid tribunals must deal with the whims of local 
government. This often leads to problems because of differences in 
purpose and prioritization.249 For example, local tribunal personnel focus 
on the immediacy of impending trials rather than spending time and 
resources training train staff. 250 Because the international members 
recognize the need to prioritize training, this can bring the different sides 
of the tribunal into conflict.251 A lack of or negative “state cooperation is 
the Achilles’ heel” of hybrid tribunals.252 
Second, the international segment of the tribunal can behave in a way 
the local personnel take as presumptuous.253 Local legal professionals, 
especially judges, are often hesitant to accept advice from outside 
sources.254 As legal professionals, they feel competent in their abilities 
and may consider it an insult to be trained as if they were new to the 
profession, especially by a junior or foreigner.255 Thus, because a hybrid 
tribunal is, by definition, interwoven with the local judiciary, there is a 
higher chance that local judicial officials feel this presumptiveness.  
Third, purely international tribunals have only themselves to blame if 
their adjudicatory processes begin to slow; hybrid tribunals are partially 
dependent on the energy, motivation, and knowledge of the local judicial 
personnel to get results, especially with regards to external functions like 
police investigation, searches, etc.256 Some scholars have posited that a 
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lack of energy or incentive on the part of the local judicial personnel is 
“the most crucial determinant” in a hybrid tribunal’s success.257 
Conversely, the positives of hybrid tribunals are just as specific as 
their shortcomings, and a hybrid tribunal can develop judicial culture in a 
myriad of ways.258 For example, first, the tribunal’s presence in the 
affected country can help build an enduring rule of law and a 
professional legal base, as well as “leav[e] an informational legacy” and 
encourage legal reform.259 This allows hybrid tribunals to overcome both 
the problem of domestic judicial legitimacy and international criminal 
tribunal legitimacy by providing one legitimate vehicle for both.260 
Second, at least theoretically, hybrid tribunals have a substantial 
advantage over purely international tribunals that comes from their 
ability “to develop local capacity through mentoring”261 rather than 
solely showing by ill-communicated example, as is the case with the 
purely international tribunals. It is far easier for a hybrid tribunal, 
constantly interacting and exchanging ideas with the local judicial 
personnel to leave a lasting positive impact on their culture than a purely 
extrinsic and aloof example thousands of miles away. Mentoring instead 
of instructing by example allows the hybrid tribunal to “be sensitive to 
the local legal culture,” an absolutely essential element in facilitating 
judicial culture development.262 
Of the five hybrid tribunals this article could examine, it will consider 
two: the Extraordinary Chambers in the Court of Cambodia (ECCC) and 
the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL).263 
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a. The Extraordinary Chambers in the Court of Cambodia 
i. Background of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Court 
of Cambodia 
In 2003 the UN and Cambodia created the ECCC to try the remaining 
members of the Khmer Rouge, a Communist regime which came to 
power in 1975 under leader Pol Pot.264 From 1975 to 1979, Cambodia 
was one of the most dangerous places on earth; a devastating 
“combination of domestic instability and international apathy rendered 
the country paralyzed [and] a once-promising government . . . a killing 
machine.”265  
Over a fifth of the Cambodian people died by starvation, torture, and 
execution; a total of 1.7 to 2 million died in a space of four years because 
of Pol Pot’s reign of terror and his forced communistic agricultural 
communes.266 The Vietnamese eventually overthrew the regionally 
disruptive regime, and in 1993 the remnants of the Khmer Rouge 
permanently dispersed and it was officially outlawed in 1994.267 
ii. Creation of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Court of 
Cambodia 
Soon after the Khmer Rouge was dispelled, the prime minister of 
Cambodia sent a letter to the UN’s Secretary General asking for an 
international criminal tribunal.268 He specifically requested that this 
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tribunal be allowed to prosecute two kinds of crimes: genocide and 
crimes against humanity.269 In addition to beginning a five year 
conversation with the UN, this letter unlocked the door for future 
involvement by the international community.270 The UN commissioned a 
report on into the Cambodia’s judiciary. The report stated that the only 
way to maintain fair trials of Khmer Rouge officials would be to create a 
purely international tribunal.271 
Tension between the UN and Cambodia arose during the following 
months and years. Cambodia insisted that the tribunal be in Cambodia, 
apply Cambodian law, and be staffed by Cambodians.272 The UN 
objected to this power being given to Cambodia because it had almost no 
legal professionals or infrastructure and could not guarantee fair trials.273 
Two years later in 1999 officially recommended a purely international 
tribunal.274 Cambodia retaliated by passing legislation setting up its own 
tribunal in 2001.275 The UN came back to the table and negotiated a 
relatively drama-free deal with Cambodia in 2003.276 Ideologically, the 
deal struck was heavily in favor of maintaining Cambodia’s state 
sovereignty—many thought at the expense of human rights.277  
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iii. The Tribunal Itself: Jurisdiction and Substantive Law of 
the Extraordinary Chambers in the Court of Cambodia 
The ECCC, located in Angk Snuol, Cambodia, was created on June 6, 
2003 by the UN and Cambodia per an official agreement to try the senior 
level leaders of the Khmer Rouge who had committed crimes between 
April 1975 and January 1979.278 Since then it has cost the UN and 
Cambodia—mostly the UN—over $200 million, secured four 
convictions, and continues to prosecute cases today.279  
The ECCC was given the power to try both domestic and non-
domestic crimes,280 genocide,281 crimes against humanity,282 and “grave 
breaches of the Geneva Conventions.”283 In the trial chamber there are 
three Cambodian judges and two foreign judges; in the appellate 
chamber there are four Cambodians and three foreigners.284 To ensure 
that at least one judge of each “side” agrees with each conviction, a 
majority of four judges is needed in the trial chamber and five judges in 
the appeals chamber.285 To maintain the theme of diversity, there are co-
prosecutors—one Cambodian and one foreigner.286 
Also, the court was located in Cambodia and relies on the Cambodian 
government for all of its logistical support, contrary to the wishes of the 
UN.287 The UN opposed the idea because Cambodia—then and now—
“remains a one-party state dominated by the Cambodian Peoples Party 
and Prime Minister Hun Sen, a recast Khmer Rouge official in power 
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since 1985.”288 There is no shift in leadership and the same corrupt 
people from the same political ideology administer so-called justice. 
While it was necessary to have the ECCC in Cambodia for judicial 
culture building’s sake, the UN was fearful that the government of 
Cambodia, having subsumed much of the Khmer Rouge’s leadership into 
its own, would subvert justice.289 Unfortunately, this fear appears to have 
been realized. 
iv. Impact of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Court of 
Cambodia on the Local Judiciary 
As exhaustively shown above, international criminal tribunals, and 
especially hybrid tribunals, can only build the local judicial culture if 
they themselves maintain institutional integrity. In this regard, the ECCC 
has failed and, by extension, has done nothing to contribute to 
Cambodia’s domestic judiciary’s culture. Indeed, every shortcoming of 
the ECCC has a direct, negative impact on Cambodia’s judicial culture. 
Even from an objective perspective, the ECCC has accomplished 
little; it has secured only four convictions, and the only other two 
indictees died and were released.290 The ECCC has also failed 
subjectively. For example, as arguably one of the most important aspect 
of the tribunal, the substantive law should have been a priority of the 
ECCC. However, it took almost a year for the court to decide what 
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substantive law it was going to apply.291 This inability to perform basic 
court functions indicates a deeper problem stemming from the corrupt 
Cambodian judiciary.  
First, internal pressure from the Cambodian government through the 
Cambodian justices destroys the ability for the ECCC to function as a 
fair and unbiased judicial institution should. Of course, given 
Cambodia’s history, this political interference has been more of an 
expectation than surprise.292 Cases have been dismissed and reopened 
several times based on which party is in power, and more than once 
specific instruction on whom to prosecute has been given to the 
Cambodian judges.293 The Cambodian government largely does not care 
about the success of the ECCC, but rather maintaining its power, even at 
the cost of hijacking the ECCC.294 This blatant obstruction of justice is 
harmful to both the ECCC and, by extension, the judicial culture 
development of Cambodia. 
Second, the supermajority requirement, which at first seemed so 
ingenious, is hampering the ability of the ECCC to operate smoothly and 
has led to serious infighting among the justices.295 Specifically with 
regards to the substantive law and procedural rules of the court, the 
ECCC’s international judges advocate upholding international law 
norms, whereas the Cambodian judges advocate whatever the 
government tells them to at that time.296 Because neither group alone has 
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the supermajority, there is a sort of gridlock which has stifled the 
ECCC’s progress.  
Third, Cambodian national courts are so ill-equipped to handle 
adjudication that using them as a foundation for this hybrid tribunal has 
proven unworkable. In Cambodia, the idea that judges are corrupt and in 
the pocket of their government is almost axiomatic; any lawyer or judge 
brave enough to faithfully administer justice was targeted by the Khmer 
Rouge.297 Like Yugoslavia and Rwanda, there was an utter decimation of 
Cambodia’s judiciary.298 Thus, when the tribunal was formed, there was 
nothing on which to build the institution that would become the ECCC—
at least nothing upon which a tribunal should be built. Cambodia insisted 
on an instrumental role in it, and yet had nothing to offer because they 
lacked “a competent, qualified judiciary.”299 Again, this has damaged 
Cambodia’s judicial culture because the ECCC’s success is critical for 
judicial culture development and post-conflict growth.300 
Fourth, the incompetence of the local judiciary is quite pervasive; 
corruption and bribery existed as the rule in pre-ECCC Cambodia, and 
continue to plague the ECCC today.301 There has never really been a 
judicial “culture of respect for the rule of law,” even in the highest 
chambers of the ECCC.302 Something that cannot be overemphasized is 
the constant and pervasive meddling of the Cambodian government, and 
the instability and illegitimacy this inflicts on ECCC and Cambodian 
jurisprudence.303 The ECCC had an opportunity to set an example and 
precedent for the rest of Cambodia’s judicial system, but does just the 
opposite through the actions of its personnel, e.g., the ECCC’s Chief 
Judge “admitted that he was taking money from the people who appeared 
before his court after their trials were over, maintaining that there was no 
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other way to survive on his salary of $30 per month.”304 It is difficult to 
lead by example or instruction when a tribunal’s chief judge publicly 
admits to taking bribes. 
Finally, many Cambodians are very sensitive to any criticisms of their 
judicial system, especially criticisms from international counterparts.305 
Indeed, one of the most common problems that beset the ECCC’s 
international judges is how to tactfully approach situations where they 
are clearly at odds with the Cambodians: especially when the Cambodian 
criminal statutes are vague.306 This problem has been exacerbated by 
debates within the ECCC, and many Cambodians judicial officials are 
now immune to remonstrance from international colleagues who stress a 
rule of law culture.307 
Thus, because of its utter failure to successfully adjudicate, there are 
serious doubts regarding the ECCC’s ability to positively influence 
judicial culture, and these doubts have largely precluded Cambodia’s 
people from paying the ECCC the slightest modicum of respect.308 
Similarly to each of its counterparts, the ECCC has the tremendous 
privilege and responsibility of shaping Cambodia’s domestic judicial 
culture.309 However, also similarly to every other tribunal, its success 
depends on the legitimacy it garners from the population at large, and, 
when dealing with a hybrid tribunal, this determination is made by the 
people concurrently with and partially based on the success of the local 
judiciary.310 
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This is the case with Cambodia. Because the ECCC exists as an 
extension of the local judiciary, it not only suffers the same woes, but, by 
virtue of association, is condemned for the same faults, albeit reasonably 
so.311 When a nation’s court system refuses to administer justice, all the 
people have left is a hope that someone else will. It is more than 
armchair politics for the Cambodians; their cultural perception and 
expectation of justice has greatly suffered. 
The Cambodian people see their judicial culture as illegitimate 
because they see the ECCC as illegitimate;312 as one, the country’s 
populace recognizes the corrupt judicial culture the ECCC has erected, 
and refuses to give it respect.313 In sum, the ECCC’s failure to change 
Cambodia’s judicial culture is even more stinging because that failure 
has destroyed a people’s hope.314  
b. The Special Court for Sierra Leone   
i. Background of Special Court for Sierra Leone 
In 1991, a partially indigenous rebel group, the Revolutionary United 
Front (“RUF”), invaded Sierra Leone from neighboring Liberia and 
began a ten-year civil war. The RUF allegedly acted with the support of 
Charles Taylor, former warlord and current president of Liberia. During 
the course of the war, Sierra Leone split into multiple factions, all of 
which engaged in “systematic war crimes.” An estimated one hundred 
thousand people were killed, and more than two million people were 
displaced. Sexual violence, such as gang rape and sexual slavery, was 
particularly prevalent: between 1997 and 1999 alone, more than 1,800 
victims of sexual violence sought medical attention from Médecins 
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Sans Frontières. In addition, Physicians for Human Rights reported that 
more than half the women who came into contact with the RUF 
suffered from sexual violence. . . . In July 1999, all of the factions had 
agreed to the Lomé Peace Agreement, which granted amnesty for all 
crimes committed by all parties and referred to the establishment of a 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (“TRC”). The UN Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General, who was not a party to the 
agreement, appended a reservation, stating that the United Nations 
would not recognize amnesty for “international crimes of genocide, 
crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other serious violations of 
international law.” . . . Following a series of negotiations, in January 
2002, the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone signed 
an agreement creating the Special Court for Sierra Leone (“SCSL”).315 
Sierra Leone’s judicial system was just as decimated as Yugoslavia’s, 
Rwanda’s, or Cambodia’s after their respective civil wars.316 It was so 
decimated, in fact, that when it came time to create the SCSL, the 
international community gave it far less deference than was given the 
ECCC.317 The main reason the UN refused to allow Sierra Leone to 
pursue trials at the local level was because its judicial culture was not 
one that prioritized a fair trial.318 Even if it did have a judicial culture that 
emphasized and prioritized fair trials, it could not prosecute offenses like 
genocide, war crimes, etc. because it does not have national laws that 
criminalize these specific crimes.319 Thus, Sierra Leone was forced to 
reach out to international institutions to prosecute its war crimes cases.320 
ii. Creation of the Special Court for Sierra Leone and Its 
Workings  
The SCSL was created on August 14, 2000 by Resolution 1315 to 
prosecute those who bore the “greatest responsibility for serious 
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violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leone law 
committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since 30 November 1996.”321 
Located in Freetown, Sierra Leone’s capital, the SCSL tried violations of 
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, Additional Protocol II, 
other serious violations of international humanitarian law, and crimes 
under Sierra Leonean law.322 
Like all the other courts discussed so far, it emphasized individual 
criminal liability, and like the ICTR and ECCC, it had concurrent 
jurisdiction with the national courts of Sierra Leone.323 The trial chamber 
had three judges: one from Sierra Leone and two foreigners, and the 
appeals chamber had five: two from Sierra Leone and three foreigners.324 
The prosecution was similarly varied.325 Along with other logistics, the 
Statute also stated that the default state for imprisonment purposes was 
Sierra Leone, but that prisoners could be moved if the circumstances 
demanded it.326 
Having successfully tried and convicted eighteen and acquitted two 
defendants, with six having died, been discharged, or fined without 
imprisonment and one still at large,327 the SCSL officially closed in 2013, 
handing over maintenance of the archives and responsibilities for 
emergency trials or appeals to the Residual Special Court for Sierra 
Leone.328 This court has less than fifteen staff members and does not 
exist to continue trying cases.329 Two unique aspects of the SCSL is that 
it accepted its funding only through donations from seven countries in 
the international community,330 and it has the power to not only try 
international crimes, but also crimes under Sierra Leonean law.331  
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iii. Failures of the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
The SCSL had several failures: First, the court did not always 
prioritize maintaining a good relationship with the domestic legal 
systems.332 Second, sometimes attorneys at the SCSL did not see it as 
part of their responsibility to educate younger, national attorneys, but 
rather to focus exclusively on the work of the tribunal.333  
Third, the SCSL did not have the legal authority to demand 
cooperation or coordination, so it often was not given; comparatively, if 
it had been created under Chapter VII of the UN’s Charter like the ICTY 
and ICTR, states, including Sierra Leone, would have had the legal 
obligation to cooperate.334 Of course, it must be noted that the aloofness 
of the government gave the SCSL critical autonomy. And, while at some 
level necessary, this space had the potential to hurt Sierra Leone’s 
judicial culture. 
A fourth flaw scholars noted in the SCSL was an alleged lack of 
support for the domestic judiciary’s community as a whole.335 Fifth, 
many young foreign attorneys inadvertently took a potentially offensive 
demeanor towards older judges when they arrived in Sierra Leone.336 The 
culture of Sierra Leone is one of great respect to elders, and the 
energetic, commanding presence of young attorneys, especially from 
England, sometimes chagrined the scant cadre of domestic judges that 
remained in Sierra Leone.337 
Sixth, local NGO workers and judicial personnel expressed frustration 
that only the top-level perpetrators faced prosecution, and this seems to 
be a valid concern.338 However, one explanation of this could be that the 
purpose of the SCSL was not to prosecute every criminal, but only 
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individuals who the national judiciary might be reticent to punish 
because of the individuals’ former positions.339 Last, a suspicion swept 
through the local populace that the international community as a whole—
and specifically the U.S.—controlled the tribunal;340 even though this 
was patently false, the local population believed it, and this has damaged 
the ability of the SCSL to positively impact the judicial culture of Sierra 
Leone.341 However, even with its struggles, there is hope that the SCSL’s 
work will have a long-term positive effect on the judicial culture in 
Sierra Leone.342 
iv. Special Court for Sierra Leone’s Impact on Judicial 
Culture  
Thankfully, the success of the SCSL has greatly overshadowed these 
potential downsides. Sierra Leone supported the tribunal practically 
wholeheartedly,343 and its civilian population, with some exceptions, 
accepted the legitimacy of the SCSL—concerned only with ancillary 
details.344 Even with some frustration from NGOs, the SCSL’s legitimacy 
overall was been strong. Interestingly, this acceptance varied based on 
socioeconomic status, with the poorer Sierra Leoneans expressing a deep 
and unequivocal approval of the SCSL.345 
As an interesting counterpoint to a potential disadvantage mentioned 
above, even though Sierra Leone’s national government is not legally 
required to assist the tribunal, the SCSL received a uniquely large 
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amount of support from the national government relative to other 
tribunals.346 This support has stemmed both from a sincere desire to assist 
the SCSL and the Special Court Ratification Act, a law “which created 
the obligation to assist the SCSL wherever possible.”347 This law has had 
great success in maintaining a balance of judicial and political 
independence while still providing crucial enforcement for the SCSL.  
For example, there are multiple examples of Sierra Leone Police 
coordinating with the SCSL on raids and arrests, something rarely if ever 
seen with other tribunals.348 At the same time, however, the government 
has also done a tremendous job of separating itself from the SCSL’s 
politics and workings.349 Although some see this as a weakness, it has 
provided the SCSL with necessary logistical support, while staying aloof 
enough that the SCSL can maintain its independence and judicial 
legitimacy, unlike the ECCC, which saw the opposite approach from its 
government.350 
Further, the international community has gotten behind the SCSL both 
monetarily and logistically.351 This has led to increased efficiency and 
growth in both the SCSL and national judiciary, generally because of the 
diversity and experience that various international attorneys bring to 
Sierra Leone via their work at the SCSL.352 One of the strengths of the 
SCSL was the strong individual leadership of those in the Registry 
division, specifically compared to the ICTY Registry.353  
Also, the process by which the SCSL was created was the most 
democratic of any tribunal. The discussion between the UN and Sierra 
Leone was conducted relatively smoothly and with all parties largely 
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satisfied by the SCSL.354 This has been a great help to judicial culture 
development because it created a positive lens through which the SCSL 
is viewed.355 Moving past its creation and potential, the SCSL has shown 
how effective an international criminal tribunal can be at developing an 
affected country’s judicial culture when it conducts intentional 
outreach.356 Indeed, the SCSL’s actions in reaching out to the local 
judiciary are exemplary and should serve as a model for future tribunals, 
hybrid or otherwise.  
SCSL’s location has been crucial to its judicial culture building 
efforts. Like any tribunal in the affected country, the SCSL’s “location in 
the Sierra [city] where the atrocities took place, enables the population to 
identify more easily with the process.”357 This has given the people “a 
sense of self-ownership over the accountability process,”358 and has led 
to a deeper respect for the rule of law in both the local legal system359 
and general population.360  
This location of the SCSL close to the geographical heart of Sierra 
Leone has given three specific benefits to the Sierra Leonean judicial 
culture. First, it has several buildings that will be able to be used by the 
local judiciary after the war.361 Second, the location of the SCSL in Sierra 
Leone has allowed budding young Sierra Leonean judicial personnel to 
get excellent training at the SCSL.362 The SCSL instills them with a sense 
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of professionalism and pride and hammers home the importance of fair 
jury trial principles.363 Finally, the SCSL has provided Sierra Leone with 
an idea of what an organized judiciary looks like.364 
Sierra Leoneans recognize that the SCSL contributes not only to 
transitional justice, but also judicial culture development and growth 
long-term; this perspicacity on the part of the populace means that 
“[n]obody therefore challenged the court’s existence.”365 The gamble the 
Sierra Leoneans took when they put trust in the SCSL has turned out 
well. Even though there was some small initial fear that the SCSL could 
disrupt peace in the region, “Sierra Leoneans are amazed at the 
revelations coming out of the court” and at the great leaps in judicial 
culture development the SCSL has allowed the domestic judiciary to 
take.366 
IV. WHY THE HYBRID TRIBUNAL IS THE MOST EFFECTIVE KIND OF 
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR BUILDING LOCAL JUDICIAL 
CULTURE 
I will lay out the factors that influence international criminal tribunals. 
Then, I will show that a hybrid tribunal can best emphasize positive 
factors and mitigate negative ones.  
a. External Factors 
Many factors that impact the legitimacy and success of international 
criminal tribunals cannot be helped or changed, but they undeniably have 
an impact on the ability of a tribunal to build the local judiciary. They 
have been grouped into five general categories: First, the kind of conflict: 
Similar though these conflicts may be in their end result of death and 
destruction, motivations for conflicts differ tremendously. The 
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Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals punished a group of men who tried to 
take over the world; the ICTY’s conflict sprung up from a desire to 
create ethnically homogenous states; the ICTR punished ethnic 
cleansing—a bloody, intense, and nearly total destruction of a people 
group, with little to no desire for territory or power; the ECCC was 
established to prosecute the heads of a purely political regime—an 
attempted communist utopia devoid of a defining motive of ethnic or 
religious discrimination.367 
Second, the affected countries’ populations’ view of the conflict and 
popular sentiments on what justice should look like determine the lens 
through which they view the tribunal, and can predetermine its fate in 
local opinion. For example, nearly all stories, anecdotal or otherwise, 
indicate that the great majority of the Rwandan and Sierra Leonean 
people condemned the guilty in the court of public opinion. Conversely, 
the former Yugoslavia’s inhabitants’ opinions of the accused largely 
depended on the viewers’ ethnicity and location.368 In Cambodia, the 
people were so temporally distant from the tribunal—a quarter century 
had elapsed—that they were fairly ambivalent about the result.369 
Third, the judicial culture and legitimacy of the domestic courts both 
pre-tribunal and after is incredibly important to the impact the tribunal 
has on local judicial culture. No affected country’s judiciary is intact 
after a conflict—nearly every modern conflict for which a tribunal has 
been made has decimated the local judiciary.370 That notwithstanding, a 
decimated local judiciary is not an absolute bar to a local judicial culture 
development. For example, even though Rwanda and Sierra Leone had 
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no judiciary and Yugoslavia had practically none, this lack of an existing 
judiciary did not hurt the SCSL or ICTR’s efforts at local judicial culture 
development.371 Rather, it was an opportunity for new growth and 
training. The ECCC (and to a much lesser extent the ICTY) stands out as 
an example of how a local judicial culture of corruption pre-tribunal can 
hamstring a tribunal’s work, especially hybrid tribunals, thereby 
hampering, if not destroying, the opportunity to build the local judicial 
culture.372 
Fourth, local corruption is perhaps the greatest external force that can 
hamper judicial culture development by international tribunals. The 
ECCC has proved singularly ineffective, and not coincidentally, has also 
proved to be singularly corrupt.373 While both the Cambodian people and 
local judicial officials understand the evisceration of their judicial system 
by conflict, they cannot forgive without hesitation the corrupt actions of 
their judicial system.374 The ICTY does not face such a pervasive 
atmosphere of fraudulence in the region’s domestic courts, but ethnic 
bias and prejudice was strongly feared by the Commission of Experts, 
which is one of the reasons the ICTY was instituted.375 This fear has 
greatly inhibited cooperation (even should the concept of cooperation 
have crossed the tribunal’s existential mind) with the local judiciary 
because their adjudications cannot be trusted. This has, in turn, turned 
both the local judiciary and the populace against the ICTY, permanently 
damaging its ability to positively affect local judicial culture 
development.376 
Finally, although not readily apparent, the support of the international 
community for the tribunal and especially its subsequent decisions is 
absolutely critical for its ability to impact the local judicial culture.377 
Nations make innumerable diplomatic decisions daily; understanding and 
accounting for the impact their decisions will have on international 
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criminal tribunals communicates respect and support for the tribunal to 
the local government and, practically, helps avoid potential international 
roadblocks for the tribunal. The existence of these factors and the level at 
which they appear should always influence the decision of whether to 
impose a purely international or hybrid tribunal or, most importantly, 
whether to have one at all. 
b. Tribunal Structure  
When the statute of a new international tribunal is being drafted, 
several critical decisions are made determining the basic outlines and 
fundamental characteristics of the tribunal. While none of these decisions 
are strictly dispositive of the tribunal’s success in any area—and thus, by 
extension, its ability to positively affect the local judicial culture—four 
of them have an undeniable impact on this success. 
First, the location of the tribunal is critical. The physical distance of 
the ICTY and ICTR from the affected countries undeniably lessened 
their ability to build the domestic legal system and imbue it with 
legitimacy, and the ICTR’s success was only made possible by its 
relatively close presence in Tanzania, not Europe.378 The SCSL is the 
quintessential example of how critical the location of the tribunal is to its 
success. It has directly and positively impacted the local judicial culture 
specifically because of its location.379 The court’s presence in the 
affected country has contributed to every positive impact on Sierra 
Leone’s judicial culture and it is doubtful whether any of them would 
have been realized if the SCSL had not been located in Sierra Leone.380 
The example of the ECCC provides an important caution to this general 
principle that tribunal presence aids in judicial culture development. The 
ECCC demonstrates that a corrupt government that is intent on stymieing 
the tribunal’s work can create an atmosphere in which the tribunal 
stagnates, both in its adjudicatory work and attempts to build the local 
judicial culture.381 
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Further, the law the tribunal enforces directly impacts the extent to 
which the local judiciary imitates the tribunal. It is most beneficial to 
have both international and domestic laws prosecuted by the court. The 
ICTY only prosecuted international crimes and did not impact the local 
judicial culture positively at all.382 Conversely, the ICTR and SCSL had, 
to very different degrees, definitely positive impacts on the judicial 
culture of their respective affected countries and both prosecuted 
violations of national laws as well as international.383 Indeed, 
legitimizing the substantive law of the local judiciary and aiding in the 
law’s evolution is among the most important and beneficial functions an 
international criminal tribunal can perform outside its normal 
adjudicatory functions. Of course, the ECCC’s ability to prosecute both 
international and national laws is not at fault for its troubles, but rather 
the Cambodian government’s nefarious intrusion in its policies and 
decisions.384 
Following in the same vein, concurrent jurisdiction is also critical to 
local judicial culture development. Allowing the local judiciary to 
prosecute its laws side by side with the tribunal or international 
components of the hybrid tribunal has proven to be a catalyst for local 
judicial legitimacy and development.385 Judicial personnel gain 
confidence, knowledge, and experience in practical prosecution and 
defense skills and, perhaps more importantly, a deeper understanding of 
legal principles necessary for a fair trial.386 The ICTY did not have 
concurrent jurisdiction with the affected country, but did begin to 
transfer cases to Bosnia’s judiciary a decade after the former was 
created.387 The region’s judiciary did not gain nearly as much experience 
as they might have, and the ICTY again proved ineffective at developing 
the local judicial culture. 
Last, the nationalities of the international tribunal’s personnel and 
judges must be diverse. As demonstrated by the SCSL, true and lasting 
judicial culture development can occur when the personnel of the 
tribunal is diverse with a heavy emphasis on employing and involving 
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the affected country’s citizens.388 Different kinds of personnel act as a 
check on each other. A significant presence of local personnel naturally 
gives legitimacy to the tribunal in the eyes of the citizenry, deepens the 
tribunal’s respect for local legal tradition and custom, and trains a new 
generation of lawyers in fair trial principles and criminal adjudication. 
Simultaneously, a large international population serves to educate this 
new generation of lawyers and keep in check any practices not in accord 
with recognized principles of fairness and justice.389 
c. Tribunal Actions  
There are three actions a tribunal can take to better the chance that its 
impact on the local judicial culture will be positive. First, it can 
communicate. This is the single most important factor, external or 
otherwise, in positively impacting the local judiciary. The concept of 
communication was absolutely foreign to the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
tribunals, and if it was not a foreign concept to the ICTY as well it made 
no one aware of that fact, especially not by its actions.390 Conversely, the 
SCSL was incredibly intentional about communicating with the local 
judiciary and saw tremendous results because of it.391 Similarly, the 
ICTR did to a limited extent and saw a commensurate amount of 
growth.392 
Second, tribunals can encourage local ownership of the judicial 
process by doing three things: (a) actively employing legal professionals 
from the affected country, thereby training the future that country’s 
future legal personnel. Pursuing Bosnian, Serbian, and Croatian interns 
has been a positive ICTY outreach, and the ICTR intentionally focused 
its employment efforts on Rwandans specifically.393 (b) Insist on 
normative standards which reflect fair trial principles. One of Rwanda’s 
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chief objections to the ICTR was that it could not impose the death 
penalty.394 A few years later, Rwanda abandoned its death penalty after 
the ICTR refused to transfer cases with it due to its use of the sentence.395 
Similarly, the ICTY spurred on the Bosnian judiciary to improve its 
standards for a fair trial by refusing to share cases until the local 
judiciary reached a satisfactory level of judicial integrity and it believed 
that a local court could ensure justice.396 (c) Leading by example. Every 
tribunal besides the ECCC has led positively by example; the SCSL 
aided in evolving Sierra Leone’s domestic judiciary’s standards of what 
constituted a fair trial and good evidentiary rules by providing an 
example of these standards in practice.397 Conversely, the ECCC has 
utterly failed to do so.398 While every other tribunal—to varying 
degrees—has exemplified the principles of justice it espouses, the 
ECCC’s corruption and highly suspect opening and reopening of cases 
based on changes in the political regime has cemented its hypocrisy in 
the minds of the Cambodian judiciary.399 Unfortunately, through its 
Cambodian judges the ECCC has set an example of corruption and 
dishonesty.400 
Third, tribunals should involve the courts in any way possible in the 
process of justice and reconciliation. For example, one of the great 
mistakes of the ICTR was that it did not acknowledge the Gacaca courts 
which proved effective in meting out justice.401 Conversely, the SCSL 
encouraged any and all prosecutions the fledgling judiciary could 
perform; it pulled the local courts along, giving them responsibility it 
thought they could handle when they could handle it.402 Basic principles 
of justice and fairness must be maintained, but different cultures express 
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this differently403 and tribunals must recognize the varied forms justice 
can take.404 
d. Why Hybrid Tribunals are the Better Option  
Hybrid tribunals are the better option for the great majority of 
conflicts for several reasons. First, they are far more flexible than their 
counterparts, and can adapt easily to a country’s needs post-conflict. This 
is especially helpful when assessing the kind of conflict and best tribunal 
response. For example, a conflict like Yugoslavia’s may need increased 
monitoring of local courts to ensure that the deep-rooted ethnic 
differences do not prejudice the judgment against the defendants. In 
Rwanda, it could probably be more hands off, allowing the Gacaca 
courts to work. It also allows the tribunal to adapt itself to the 
expectations of the local people and judiciary while still maintaining core 
fair trial principles. 
Second, hybrid tribunals allow for an easier infusion of international 
principles into the local judiciary because they are not seen as an external 
body forcing principles on the country’s judiciary, but a partner 
advancing in step with it. This simultaneously injects international 
standards into the local judicial culture while maintaining any legitimacy 
it has post-conflict. Third, they are far better at communication than 
public international tribunals. Not only do they have to communicate 
more effectively for public international tribunals for the sake of their 
prosecutions and sentences, but they also have an incentive to 
communicate better; a stronger domestic judiciary is a stronger tribunal 
and vice versa. We even see this in Cambodia, albeit for discouragingly 
dishonest purposes. Increased communication from honest hybrid 
tribunals is precisely what the domestic judiciary needs.  
Fourth, hybrid tribunals are located inside the affected country itself. 
Of course, there is nothing to prohibit a public international tribunal from 
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being located in the affected country. But, hybrid tribunals combine 
location with institutional intimacy, something no public international 
tribunal can match. Indeed, location in the affected country and 
consistent communication seem to be the two key elements for a tribunal 
success in building local judicial culture, and hybrid tribunals have both. 
Fifth, hybrid tribunals are better at enforcing local laws, which gives 
both the laws themselves legitimacy and the judiciary that enforces and 
maintains them. Hybrid tribunals are better for the simple fact that they 
can combine any existing knowledge of and experience with these laws 
in the form of the domestic portion of the tribunal’s personnel with 
consistent application of international legal norms. They both apply the 
law in tandem with the domestic judiciary and assist its evolution.405  
Sixth, hybrid tribunals best combine the need for an internationally 
diverse presence and training the next generation of the affected 
country’s prosecutors. In a public international tribunal there could 
theoretically be a push to focus on hiring the affected country’s attorneys 
(Rwanda did this),406 but only in a hybrid tribunal is there a natural and 
inescapable exchange between local legal personnel and a diverse mix of 
international officers. This diversification also allows hybrid tribunals to 
avoid the repeat of a Tokyo tribunal situation. 
Granted, it is more difficult to leverage the local judiciary because it 
can prosecute any case the tribunal can due to it being half the tribunal 
itself. While this may seem to get rid of a bargaining chip public 
international tribunals have, the hybrid tribunal more than makes up for 
this by its ability to actively lead the tribunal by example. It can 
encourage and oversee the implementation of international norms 
directly rather than only encouraging them remotely. Thus, though it is 
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beneficial for the local judiciary improve independently, the hybrid 
tribunal provides a healthier path to judicial culture growth. 
V. NEED FOR HYBRID TRIBUNALS WITH THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT  
Given the existence of the International Criminal Court (ICC), there is 
an implicit question that must be answered as to whether there is even a 
need for public international tribunals or hybrid tribunals at all. There 
most definitely is.  
The ICC, located in The Hague, was created by the Rome Statute, and 
is the “the first permanent, treaty based, international criminal court 
established to help end impunity for the perpetrators of the most serious 
crimes of concern to the international community.”407 Almost 120 
countries have ratified the Rome Statute, including major players in the 
international community such as France, Germany, and the United 
Kingdom.408 By the same token, though, the United States, China, 
Russia, and Japan have all not yet ratified. There is a major point of 
disagreement running through the international community with regards 
to the ICC’s usefulness, especially given that it is funded by donations 
from various states and NGOs.409 The ICC has only secured two 
convictions in its almost 13 years of existence, and has controversially 
focused almost exclusively on prosecuting perceived violations in 
Africa.410 
Irrespective of the objective failure of the ICC and especially 
irrespective of its philosophy, allowing it to prosecute cases in lieu of a 
hybrid tribunal or public international tribunal would do nothing to build 
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local judicial culture, and would probably even damage it. Indeed, in 
addition to the reasons set out above as to why a hybrid tribunal is the 
preferred mechanism, the ICC would be worse for the judicial culture of 
affected nations than either a public international tribunal or hybrid 
tribunal for four reasons. 
First, the ICC would have even less of an incentive to communicate 
with local governments than would a public international tribunal. By its 
very nature the ICC is not designed to specialize in one country’s 
problems, and special care and attention is precisely what a devastated 
judiciary needs post-conflict. Philosophically, ad hoc tribunals are 
instituted because there is a very large and very specific problem that 
needs to be addressed, while the ICC is the opposite. With the specific 
mission of hybrids can come specific help; but, it is not the ICC’s 
mission to specifically help any country’s judiciary. Thus, while the ICC 
might communicate no worse than the ICTY, it cannot match the 
communicative efficiency of a hybrid tribunal. 
Also, the ICC cannot logistically handle the number of cases most of 
these conflicts generate. The ICC is theoretically supposed to be a court 
of last resort: a court that only is involved when a nation’s judiciary 
cannot effectively prosecute on its own.411 So far, the ICC has not shown 
it could do this even on a small scale let alone a large one. Its two 
convictions in 12 years leave little hope that it could do the job of a 
public international tribunal or hybrid tribunal. 
Further, the ICC would not provide leadership to the domestic 
judiciary by example, nor would it provide case transferring incentives 
like the ICTY and ICTR. Again, the ICC is a court designed only to 
prosecute occasionally, and not to guide a local judiciary on the road to 
recovery by focusing on judicial culture.412 Nor did the drafters envision 
a situation where the ICC would hand a case off to the local court system 
to prosecute, let alone several of them on a consistent basis as was seen 
in the ICTR and ICTY’s twilight years.413 
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Finally, the ICC leaves no infrastructure for the local judiciary in 
personnel or buildings. Unlike the SCSL and, to a lesser extent the ICTR, 
the ICC conducts no training of legal professionals; further, its building 
is in The Hague and, thus, it will leave no judicial buildings in any 
affected country. So far, given that the only two prosecutions have been 
of Congolese citizens, this has not turned out to be a tremendous issue, 
but this is because the ICC has done so little, and not because 
infrastructure is an unimportant issue. Personnel and physical 
infrastructure is one of the most important things to provide a fledgling 
judiciary,414 and the ICC fails in this regard.415  
Conversely, some may say the ICC helps build local judicial culture 
by ensuring that the local judiciary handles the bulk of the work. The 
problem with this notion is that in countries where there could be a 
question of whether to install a public international tribunal or hybrid 
tribunal rather than let the ICC prosecute, there is generally no judiciary 
to handle the work,416 and if there is it reeks of corruption. There is 
definitely a need for some court besides the ICC.417 
In sum, the ICC does not help local judicial culture, and thus does not 
alleviate the continuing need for public international tribunals and hybrid 
tribunals in special conflict situations. Indeed, as one writer even 
suggests, given the ICC’s notable focus on African countries, a regional 
court for African cases might be created to effectively do what the ICC 
has attempted to do but cannot.418 In evaluating an international court 
only by the impact it has on local judicial culture, ICC funds would be 
much better spent on a hybrid tribunal for Congo or any other future 
country rather than spent on an institution which does nothing both 
generally and specifically to help the local judicial culture.419 In fact, in 
  
 414. See supra, Part III(b)(iv) and references cited therein. 
 415. Sadat, supra note 194, at 14-15. 
 416. See, e.g., supra, Part II(b)(ii) and references cited therein. See also, supra n. 
79. 
 417. Sadat, supra note 194, at 15. 
 418. David Davenport, International Criminal Court: 12 Years, $1 Billion, 2 
Convictions (Mar. 12, 2014)  
http://www.forbes.com/sites/daviddavenport/2014/03/12/international-criminal-court-12-
years-1-billion-2-convictions-2/ (“Since all the ICC cases so far have been brought in 
Africa, perhaps it would make sense to develop an African regional court.”). 
 419. “What if these hundreds of millions of dollars were invested directly into the 
national judiciaries of these countries, allowing the trials to take place closer to home 
 
276 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 24.1 
keeping local judicial culture development as a top priority, it would be 
better to have a public international tribunal—expensive, cumbersome, 
and unwieldy as they may be—than the ICC.420 
CONCLUSION  
As has been shown, public international tribunals suffer several 
intrinsic flaws that prohibit them from effectively shaping domestic 
judicial culture. In the examples of both the ICTY and ICTR, factors like 
remoteness, a lack of communication, and the inherent aloofness of a 
public international tribunal create a relational and professional distance 
from the local courts that neither has fully bridged (although the ICTR 
has done better in this respect).  
Conversely, hybrid tribunals have proven to be very sensitive and 
influential with regards to local judicial culture and should always be 
used above purely international tribunals if there is such an opportunity. 
Of course, hybrid tribunals “are not necessarily a panacea, addressing all 
needs of societies emerging from violence, repression, or war,” and there 
is no single, perfect model of hybrid tribunals.421 Even so, the ECCC and 
SCSL had a clear effect on the judiciary of the affected country. 
Irrespective of the fact that the SCSL’s was markedly positive while the 
ECCC’s was negative, the point remains that hybrid tribunals can and do 
have much more of an effect than their purely international counterparts.  
Many concerns influence the development of international criminal 
tribunals; every situation will have its nuances and complexities, and the 
  
where witnesses might be more readily available and the sense of justice and healing 
would be more directly felt?” Id. See also, Sadat, supra note 194, at 14-15. 
 420. Sadat, supra note 194, at 14-15. See also Davenport, supra note 418. Another 
alternative might be temporary international tribunals such as those created to deal with 
the massive genocide in Rwanda, or in the former Yugoslavia and elsewhere. These 
tribunals have not been inexpensive either, but at least they have brought hundreds of 
cases and a large number of convictions. By comparison, the trial docket in The Hague is 
embarrassingly small. 
 421. Sriram, supra note 316, at 506. Of course, it is not whether hybrid tribunals 
are the perfect jurisprudential answer to all international problems—no tribunal ever will 
be—but rather whether they offer the local judicial culture the best chance at a full 
recovery. Definitely, there still remain questions of whether certain “problems, such as 
the disconnect between international and local processes, and a lack of understanding by . 
. . the local population” will cripple ongoing hybrid tribunals the way they have purely 
international ones. Id. at 476. 
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design of any future tribunal, purely international or hybrid, must be 
uniquely shaped to that conflict.422 However, with regards to the question 
of which best develops local judicial culture—the most certain way to 
assure a permanent, stable society—the answer is, and must be, hybrid 
tribunals. 
  
 422. Nielsen, supra note 297, at 325. Indeed, “[a]ny temptation to standardise 
hybrid tribunals should be resisted. Their design must reflect the unique circumstances in 
which they have to operate, the important challenges they face, and the distinctive aims 
they pursue.” Costi, supra note 223, at 239. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
